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Abstract: We develop and test a simple theory of the conservation area designation process in which we 
postulate that the level of designation is chosen to comply with interests of local homeowners. Conserva-
tion areas provide benefits to local homeowners by reducing uncertainty regarding the future of their area. 
At the same time, the restrictions impose a cost by limiting the degree to which properties can be altered. 
In line with our model predictions we find that an increase in preferences for historic character by the 
local population increases the likelihood of a designation, and that new designations at the margin are not 
associated with significant house price capitalisation effects. 
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Forthcoming in Economic Journal 
1 Introduction 
One of the key motivations for a variety of spatial planning policies is to solve coordination 
problems inherent to free markets. Among such policies historic preservation occupies a 
leading position in terms of the rigidity of the related regulations as well as the complexity 
of related social and private costs and benefits. These policies restrict individual property 
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rights in order to protect buildings with a particular aesthetic, cultural or historic value. In 
doing so the policy may overcome a coordination problem by ensuring that owners can no 
longer “freeride” on the character of nearby buildings while making inappropriate changes 
to their own properties. In other words it may help to solve a so-called prisoner’s dilemma 
(Holman and Ahlfeldt, 2015). A welfare-maximising preservation policy must take into ac-
count the social costs and benefits of preservation incurred by the wider society and even 
future generations. It is therefore unlikely that designation decisions that are considered 
socially optimal are also in the interest of local homeowners. In this paper we analyse 
whether owners are able to ‘game the system’ to their advantage i.e. whether the designa-
tion status of each zone in a neighbourhood is determined by the preferences of the home-
owners residing there. We answer this question by deriving a model of the designation pro-
cess, in which a planner acts as an agent of local homeowners, and then empirically testing 
its predictions. 
Our theory distinguishes between a heritage effect, which can be internal or external, i.e. the 
effect of the appearance of a historic building on the perceived value of the house itself (in-
ternal) or nearby houses (external), and a policy effect, which results from the legal treat-
ment of the designation policy. We argue that with positive heritage effects, the policy ben-
efits the owners by removing uncertainty regarding the future of the neighbourhood, i.e. the 
presence of the heritage effect. These benefits are opposed by the costs of regulation (in the 
form of development restrictions and maintenance obligations) so that the net effect of the 
policy is ambiguous. Our theoretical framework predicts positive but diminishing returns 
to the share of designated land within a neighbourhood. Taking on the assumption that the 
planner acts in the interests of local homeowners we can derive a condition for the (politi-
cal) equilibrium level of designation. This condition generates two empirically testable hy-
potheses. Firstly, new designations will result from increases in the local preferences for 
heritage. Secondly, in equilibrium, the marginal costs and benefits of designation will offset 
each other, resulting in a zero impact of new designations on house prices. At all other loca-
tions in a neighbourhood the effect will be positive. 
We test these implications using two different empirical approaches. Firstly, we estimate 
the effect of changes in neighbourhood composition—what we define as gentrification—on 
the likelihood of designations. We address endogeneity concerns using an instrumental var-
iable approach. Secondly, we use a variant of the difference-in-differences (DD) method to 
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estimate the effect of new designations on the market value of properties. Our method is 
well suited to accommodate the endogenous nature of the treatment as it allows for heter-
ogeneous pre-existing trends and a spatiotemporal structure of the treatment effect. Our 
analysis is based on the whole of England, making use of 1 million property transactions 
from 1995 to 2010 and approximately 8,000 designated conservation areas (CAs), of which 
915 were designated in the same observation period. We also make use of ward-level edu-
cation data from the UK census for 1991, 2001 and 2011 in order to analyse the effect of 
changing neighbourhood characteristics on the designation status. Previewing our results, 
we find that an increase in the local share of residents holding a university or college degree 
leads to an expansion of the designated area. The property price effect inside newly desig-
nated CAs turns out not to be statistically distinguishable from zero. We find evidence that 
the effect just outside the CA boundary is positive and significant. These results are in line 
with the political equilibrium policy level, suggesting that the planner adheres to local 
homeowner interests. 
Our analysis of the CA designation process adds to a growing body of literature on the po-
litical economy of housing markets, which implicitly or explicitly assumes that property 
owners are able to influence political outcomes in their own interest (e.g. Ahlfeldt and 
Maennig, 2015; Brunner and Sonstelie, 2003; Brunner et al., 2001; Cellini et al., 2010; 
Dehring et al., 2008; Fischel, 2001a, 2001b; Hilber and Mayer, 2009; Oates, 1969). We also 
contribute to a literature that investigates policies related to spatial externalities (Hansen 
and Libecap, 2004; Koster and Rouwendal, 2014; Libecap and Lueck, 2011; Rossi‐Hansberg 
et al., 2010), and a literature that investigates the costs and benefits of restrictive planning 
regimes (e.g. Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; Cheshire et al., 2011; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2015). 
Our results are also relevant to research that has looked into the value amenities add to 
neighbourhoods and cities more generally (e.g. Bayer et al., 2007; Brueckner et al., 1999; 
Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2001; Sheppard, 
2014). Notably, there is also a growing body of literature that investigates the property price 
effects of designation policies, mostly focussed on the U.S. (e.g. Asabere et al., 1989; Asabere 
and Huffman, 1994; Asabere et al., 1994; Coulson and Lahr, 2005; Coulson and Leichenko, 
2001; Glaeser, 2011; Leichenko et al., 2001; Noonan, 2007; Noonan and Krupka, 2011; 
Schaeffer and Millerick, 1991).  
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The key contribution of this study is to provide insights into the political economy of CA 
designation and to examine whether the outcome follows local homeowners’ interests. We 
also make a number of more specific, though still important, contributions. Firstly, the the-
oretical framework we develop lends a structure to the designation process that helps to 
interpret the existing evidence that has typically been derived from ad hoc empirical mod-
els. Secondly, our analysis of CA effects on property prices is one of the few rigorous analysis 
of this kind available for Europe (e.g. Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2010; Koster et al., 2014; Lazrak 
et al., 2013) and the first to analyse England. It is unique in terms of the size and spatial 
detail of the data set and special in its focus on the spatial modelling of heritage externalities. 
Thirdly, our difference-in-differences analysis of the designation effects on property prices 
is one of the few studies that uses a quasi-experimental research design to separate the pol-
icy effect of designation from correlated location effects (Been et al., 2015; Koster et al., 
2014; Noonan and Krupka, 2011). Fourthly, we make use of novel variations of the DD ap-
proach to identify temporal and spatial trends and discontinuities in policy effects, which 
could be applied more generally to programme evaluations. Fifthly, we provide one of the 
few empirical analyses of the determinants of heritage designation (Maskey et al., 2009; 
Noonan and Krupka, 2010, 2011). More generally, we establish a novel connection between 
the spatial outcome of a political bargaining process and one of the most striking contem-
porary urban phenomena: gentrification. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces our theoretical model 
of heritage designations and the institutional setting. Section 3 presents our empirical strat-
egy. A presentation and discussion of our empirical results is in section 4. The last section 
concludes. 
2 Theory and context 
2.1  Theoretical framework 
We assume that a linear neighbourhood exists along a spatial dimension 𝑥 on the interval 
[0,1]. At each point along 𝑥 there exists a small zone of housing which may be designated as 
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a CA as a whole or not.1 Specific to each zone, housing units are endowed with distinct levels 
of internal heritage, which encompasses interior and exterior features that provide utility 
to the occupant. This internal heritage level monotonically declines in distance from the 
neighbourhood centre: ℎ(𝑥) = ℎ̅𝑔(𝑥), where  𝑔(𝑥) ≥ 0  is a heritage density function with 
a strictly negative first derivative 𝑔𝑥 < 0 and ℎ̅ ≥ 0 is a scale parameter that reflects the 
overall neighbourhood endowment with heritage.2 Each unit of internal heritage at location 
x also provides utility to occupants at all other locations through a spatial externality as it 
contributes to the neighbourhood character. In the absence of regulation owners have no 
control over redevelopments at other locations that are potentially detrimental to the char-
acter of the neighbourhood. The long-run expected heritage character, thus, depends on a 
preservation probability 0 ≤ 𝜋 < 1. Abstracting from a spatial decay in the heritage exter-
nality we define the external heritage H as the aggregate of the expected long-run preserved 
internal heritage across all locations in the neighbourhood. A social planner may designate 
zones as CAs from the centre out to a point 𝐷 ≤ 1 in the neighbourhood. We assume the 
effect of the policy is to raise the preservation probability to full certainty.3 The level of ex-
ternal heritage is therefore equal to the integral of the internal heritage distribution up to 
𝐷 plus the integral of the preservation probability 𝜋 times the distribution thereafter: 
𝐻(𝐷) = ∫ ℎ(𝑥)
𝐷
0
𝑑𝑥 + 𝜋 ∫ ℎ(𝑥)
1
𝐷
𝑑𝑥 
(1) 
In keeping with intuition the partial derivatives reveal that designation increases external 
heritage at a decreasing rate: 𝐻𝐷 = (1 − 𝜋)ℎ(𝐷) > 0; 𝐻𝐷𝐷 = (1 − 𝜋)ℎ𝐷 < 0. To owners, the 
designation of their zone comes at the cost of restricted development rights 𝑐(𝑥 ≤ 𝐷). Util-
ity increases in locational amenities 𝑎(𝑥), the consumption of a composite numeraire good 
X and housing space L: 
                                                             
1  The planner can either designate the whole zone or none of the zone, consistent with the idea of 
CAs as ensembles of buildings that work together to produce a desirable local character. Protec-
tion of single buildings is covered by listed building status. Designating a zone is assumed to ap-
proximate a marginal increase in the level of designation for the whole neighbourhood. Essentially 
the zone represents an infinitely small part of the whole neighbourhood. 
2  This downward slope could be rationalised if a neighbourhood grew outwards from the centre 
and if heritage is related to housing age. 
3  Our argument does not depend on the assumption of full preservation probability, only that 
preservation is more likely inside CAs. 
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𝑈(𝑥) = 𝑈(ℎ(𝑥), 𝐻(𝐷), 𝑐(𝑥 ≤ 𝐷), 𝑎(𝑥), 𝑋, 𝐿) (2) 
, with 𝑈ℎ > 0, 𝑈𝐻 > 0, 𝑈𝑐 < 0, 𝑈𝑎 > 0; 𝑈𝑋 > 0; 𝑈𝐿 > 0; 𝑈𝑋𝑋 < 0; 𝑈𝐿𝐿 < 0; 𝑈𝐷𝐷 < 0. 4 At any 
zone not being newly designated (i.e. where 𝑥 ≠ 𝐷) the marginal utility from designating an 
additional zone is strictly positive: 𝑈𝐷(𝑥 ≠ 𝐷) = 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷 > 0. For zones that are themselves 
designated the marginal utility is 𝑈𝐷(𝑥 ≠ 𝐷) = 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷 + 𝑈𝐶 . We posit that a social planner 
acts on behalf of the owners and we thus designate all zones where the effect of being des-
ignated is non-negative.  
Hypothesis 1: The political equilibrium designation share 𝐷∗ increases with the preferences 
for heritage 𝑈𝐻  
We can solve for the political equilibrium level of designation D* by setting the marginal 
utility from designation to zero (𝑈𝐷(𝑥 ≠ 𝐷) = 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷 + 𝑈𝐶 = 0), i.e. we find the zone where 
the costs and benefits of designation cancel out:5 
𝐷∗ = 𝑔−1 (
−𝑈𝐶
𝑈𝐻(1 − 𝜋)ℎ̅
) (3) 
In keeping with intuition, this political equilibrium designation share increases with pref-
erence for heritage and the heritage endowment of the neighbourhood and decreases in the 
cost of designation and the preservation probability (𝐷𝑈𝐻
∗ > 0, 𝐷ℎ0
∗ > 0, 𝐷𝑈𝐶
∗ < 0, 𝐷𝜋
∗ < 0). 
While all predictions are amenable to empirical tests, in principle, data limitations dictate 
that we concentrate on the first prediction (𝐷𝑈𝐻
∗ > 0) when taking equation (3) to the data.  
To develop a testable hypothesis on whether the equilibrium condition is fulfilled, i.e. the 
planner sets 𝐷 = 𝐷∗, we incorporate capitalisation effects in the next step. We first assume 
that individuals maximise their utility defined above subject to a budget constraint 𝑊 =
𝑋 + 𝜃(𝑥)𝐿, where 𝜃(𝑥) is a housing bid rent. The utility function is quasi-concave in X and 
                                                             
4  The diminishing marginal utility of designation 𝑈𝐷𝐷 < 0 does not depend on diminishing marginal 
utility of external heritage 𝑈𝐻𝐻 . In fact, 𝑈𝐻𝐻 may be positive as long as the effect does not outweigh 
the decreasing returns to designation given by the downward slope in the internal heritage distri-
bution: 𝑈𝐻𝐻 < −
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷
𝐻𝐷𝐻𝐷
𝐻𝐷𝐷 so that 𝑈𝐷𝐷 < 0. 
5  Under the assumptions made there will be no designation if the marginal costs of designation ex-
ceed the marginal benefits even at the centre (𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷(𝐷 = 0) <  −𝑈𝐶) and full designation if the 
marginal benefits of designation at least equalise marginal costs at the outer margin 
(𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷(𝐷 = 1) ≥  −𝑈𝐶). For the remaining cases (𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷(𝐷 = 0) ≤  −𝑈𝐶 >  𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷(𝐷 = 1)) the so-
lution in the text applies.  
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L, competition is perfect, thus maximisation results in the Marshallian demand functions 
𝑋𝑑(𝑊, 𝜃(𝑥)), and 𝐿𝑑(𝑊, 𝜃(𝑥)) and the following indirect utility function:  
𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑉(ℎ(𝑥), 𝐻(𝐷), 𝑐(𝑥 ≤ 𝐷), 𝑎(𝑥), 𝑋𝑑(𝑊, 𝜃(𝑥)), 𝐿𝑑(𝑊, 𝜃(𝑥))) (4) 
, with 𝑉𝑊 > 0 and 𝑉𝜃 < 0 (given by the Envelope Theorem). Assuming perfect mobility, a 
central condition of the spatial equilibrium is that ceteris paribus any utility effect from a 
change in designation must be compensated for by an adjustment in rent to keep utility 
constant at an exogenous reservation level, i.e. 𝑉𝐷𝑑𝐷 = −𝑉𝜃𝑑𝜃 and, thus, 𝜃𝐷 = −𝑉𝐷/𝑉𝜃.  
Hypothesis 2: In the political equilibrium D, designation of a zone leads to a zero capitalisation 
effect inside the zone but a positive effect in the rest of the neighbourhood.  
The marginal capitalisation effect of designation for the designated zone (𝑥 = 𝐷) and zones 
in the rest of the neighbourhood (𝑥 ≠ 𝐷) is: 
𝜃𝐷(𝑥 = 𝐷) = −
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷 + 𝑈𝐶
𝑈𝜃
;  𝜃𝐷(𝑥 ≠ 𝐷) = −
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷
𝑈𝜃
 (5) 
If the planner sets the level of designation to the political equilibrium described above 
(where 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷 = −𝑈𝐶) there will be a zero designation effect inside new designations 
𝜃𝐷(𝑥 = 𝐷
∗) = 0 and a positive effect outside 𝜃𝐷(𝑥 ≠ 𝐷
∗) > 0. This provides a direct test of 
whether planners in practice design designation policies in the interest of local homeown-
ers. Note that if the designation share was greater than our defined political equilibrium 
(𝐷’ > 𝐷∗) then the marginal costs would exceed the benefits for the marginal zone (i.e. 
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐷 < −𝑈𝐶) and there would be a negative capitalisation effect inside marginal designa-
tions: 𝜃𝐷(𝑥 = 𝐷′) < 0. This is a result that we would also be able to detect with our empirical 
tests. 
A final note is due on the nature of the political equilibrium we have defined. If the planner 
were able to compensate owners for the cost of designation incurred in the form of devel-
opment restrictions it would be efficient and equitable to extend the CA further out. The 
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intuition is that the marginal benefits of designation spread to all zones in the neighbour-
hood while the marginal costs are only incurred by the marginal zone.6 The political equi-
librium 𝐷∗ therefore is a second-best solution for the neighbourhood, which avoids distri-
butional conflicts in a world where transfers are not available (such as in England). How-
ever, the neighbourhood optimum with transfers is a first-best solution only for the neigh-
bourhood, but is not necessarily a social optimum as it does not take into account either the 
benefits of preservation to residents in other neighbourhoods or the impact of supply re-
strictions on rents at the housing market level. 
2.2 Institutional context 
In England, the designation of CAs started in 1967 and continues today under provisions 69 
and 70 of the Planning Act 1990 (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas).7 Conservation 
areas are those that have been identified as having “special architectural or historic interest, 
the character or appearance of which is desirable to preserve or to enhance” (Section 69). 
The Planning Policy Guidance Note 15 (PPG15) states that a CA “may form groups of build-
ings, open spaces, trees, historic street patterns, village greens or features of historic or ar-
chaeological interest. It is the character of the areas rather than individual buildings that 
CAs seek to enhance.” Conservation areas are designated on the grounds of local and re-
gional criteria. Following designation, the Local Authority has more control over minor de-
velopments and the demolition of buildings (Botrill, 2005). However, the protection an area 
receives when it is designated a CA is determined at the national level to reflect the wider 
interests of society. 
In 2011 there were around 9,800 CAs in England. Conservation areas vary in character and 
size. Many have strong historical links, for example, an architectural style associated with a 
certain period. Besides these characteristics, designation is made based on softer benefits 
said to have emanated from CA designation, including the creation of a unique sense of 
place-based identity, encouraging community cohesion and promoting regeneration (HM 
                                                             
6  If there are N equally populated zones in along x the neighbourhood optimum (NO) will be 𝐷𝑁𝑂 =
𝑔−1(𝑈𝐶/[𝑁 × 𝑈𝐻(1 − 𝜋)ℎ̅]), which increases with the number of zones 𝐷𝑁 > 0.  
7  However, the first legislation to protect the historic environment was enacted in 1882 when the 
Ancient Monuments Protection Act was passed to protect a small number of designated ancient 
monuments. More statutory measures came into force in the ensuing years, but it was the passage 
of the Ancient Monuments Consolidation and Amendment Act in 1913 that set out a more com-
prehensive legislative framework for the protection of ancient monuments. 
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Government, 2010).8 This ‘instrumentalisation’ of conservation policy, which seeks to en-
compass heritage values, economic values and public policy outcomes, has been identified 
as a key shift in the English policy context (Pendlebury, 2009; Strange, 2003). This is reflec-
tive of the notion of heritage not as a single definable entity, but as a political, social, cultural 
and economic “bundle of processes” (Avrami, 2000 cited in Pendlebury, 2009: 7). 
In combination with bottom-up schemes leading to designation (e.g. community-led desig-
nation), the complex heritage preservation agenda, which pursues a multitude of objectives, 
and the institutional setting with responsibilities shared across several institutional layers 
creates significant scope for organised interest groups like property owners to influence the 
outcome of a political bargaining process. 
3 Empirical strategy 
3.1  Designation process 
To develop an empirical test of Hypothesis 1, that an increase in the heritage preferences 
𝑈𝐻 leads to increases in the designation share 𝐷
∗, we specify some parametric versions of 
the more general functions used in section 2. In particular, we assume a linear distribution 
of internal heritage: ℎ(𝑥) = ℎ̅(1 − 𝑥) and a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
 𝑈(𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥)𝑒𝜑ℎ(𝑥)𝑒𝛾𝐻(𝐷)𝑒𝑐(𝑥≤𝐷)𝑋𝛿𝐿1−𝛿. The political equilibrium designation share is then 
𝐷∗ = 1 −
𝑐
(1 − 𝜋)𝛾ℎ̅
 (6) 
We adopt the common assertion that the demand for urban consumption amenities in-
creases in education and income (Brueckner et al., 1999; Carlino and Saiz, 2008; Falck et al., 
2014; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006; Shapiro, 2006; van Duijn and Rouwendal, 2013, 2014). It 
has been shown that rich and well-educated people have a higher willingness to pay for 
living in CAs (Koster et al., 2014) and especially so for living in more distinctive areas 
(Ahlfeldt and Holman, 2014). Building on this literature, we assume that the preference for 
                                                             
8  For details see HM Government (2010): The Government’s Statement on the Historic Environment 
for England. London: DCMS. 
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heritage 𝛾𝑛 in a neighbourhood 𝑛 at time t is related to the share of people in the neighbour-
hood who hold a higher education certificate (𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛𝑡)9 with the following functional form: 
𝛾𝑛𝑡 = 𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛𝑡
𝜗𝑒−𝜀𝑛𝑡  (7) 
where 𝜗 > 0 such that the relationship is positive. The selection of DEG, rather than years 
of schooling, as an educational proxy is driven by data availability. Typically, those with 
(without) degrees have 16 (12) years of schooling. Therefore, in a neighbourhood with a 
25% degree share, a doubling of the degree share is roughly equivalent to one year of 
schooling. Since the purpose of our empirical exercise is to evaluate the causal impact of 
changes in heritage preferences on designation status – and not the causal impact of educa-
tion on heritage preference – it is sufficient to assume that 𝜗 captures a correlation between 
education and heritage preferences. 𝜀𝑛𝑡 is a random disturbance term capturing determi-
nants of heritage preferences that are not correlated with education. Rearranging the equi-
librium designation share equation (6), substituting the education degree proxy relation-
ship in (7) and taking logs we arrive at the following empirical specification: 
log(1 − 𝐷𝑛𝑡) = 𝛼 − 𝜗 log(𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛𝑡) − 𝜔𝑛 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡 (8) 
where 𝛼 = log(1 − 𝜋) − log(𝑐) and  𝜔𝑛 = log(ℎ̅𝑛) + 𝑙𝑛. (9) 
The 𝑛 subscripts correspond to the individual ‘neighbourhoods’ of our theoretical model 
and we choose to represent these empirically as UK census wards. Wards are the smallest 
geographical areas that are comparable between 1991 and 2011 censuses. Because of data 
availability we use the census years of 1991 and 2011 as our time periods. All idiosyncratic 
time-invariant location components 𝑙𝑛 (location-specific determinants of designation not 
modelled in our theory) and the unobserved heritage endowment ℎ̅𝑛 of a neighbourhood 𝑛 
as captured by 𝜔𝑛 as well as the preservation probability 𝜋 and the costs to owners of con-
servation policies are removed by taking first-differences: 
∆log(1 − 𝐷𝑛) = ∆𝛼 − 𝜗 ∆log(𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛) + ∆𝜀𝑛 (10) 
                                                             
9  We also use income as a proxy for a subsample of our data set – results are reported in the appen-
dix (section 5.1). 
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Our estimation equation now depicts that a neighbourhood change reflected in a positive 
change in (logged) educational degree share causes the (logged) share of non-designated 
land on the left-hand side to decrease. This is simply another way of saying that a positive 
change in educational degree leads to a higher designation share, although the transfor-
mation is non-linear. Note that we implicitly assume that we are in equilibrium in the sense 
that all areas that should be designated at 𝑡 are in fact designated. This is in line with Ahlfeldt 
and Holman (2014) who show that the distinctiveness of CAs tends to decline in their year 
of designation. Moreover, we estimate our model using a long difference between 1991 and 
2011, which is more than two decades after the start of the policy and the initial wave of 
designations. By 1991 more than 78% of the CAs existing in 2011 had already been desig-
nated. Results for the smaller differences between 1991–2001 and 2001–2011, respec-
tively, are reported in the appendix. 
Equation (10) evidently follows from a stylised model world. In the empirical implementa-
tion we add a number of covariates to control for alternative determinants of designation. 
The ongoing designation is then only determined by the local changes in preferences, the 
steady ageing of buildings and the effects on heritage, which are differentiated out. To con-
trol for contagion effects in designation we add the initial (1991) designation share which 
we instrument with the share in 1981 to avoid a mechanical relationship with the depend-
ent variable. A number of variables are added to account for heterogeneity in the net bene-
fits of designation and abilities to express (collective) opinions in a political bargaining that 
may influence the designation decision. These include the initial (1991) degree share, the 
homeownership rate, the household size, the average population age and the share of for-
eigners (both in initial shares and changes). We alter the baseline model in a number of 
robustness checks to account for institutional heterogeneity at the Travel to Work Area 
(TTWA) level, neighbourhood appreciation trends and, to the extent possible, the historic 
and physical quality of the housing stock.  
In practice, however, it is difficult to control for all determinants of designation that are ex-
ternal to our model. One particular concern is that areas can be designated if the heritage is 
threatened by poor maintenance in a declining neighbourhood. Such derelict will likely be 
negatively correlated with our explanatory variable and is unlikely to be fully captured by 
the control variables we have at hand. At the same time, the policy itself could make it more 
likely that educated people are attracted to designated areas due to a different valuation of 
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uncertainty (reverse causality). Since an OLS estimation of equation (10) can result in a sig-
nificant bias in either direction we make use of instrumental variables 𝑧𝑛, which predict 
changes in education, 𝜌(𝑧𝑛, ∆log 𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛) ≠ 0, but must be conditionally uncorrelated with 
the differenced error term,  𝜌(𝑧𝑛, ∆𝜀𝑛𝑡) = 0. We argue that rail station density (in London, 
additionally Underground station) and also effective employment accessibility (both time-
invariant in levels) are good predictors of neighbourhood gentrification (Florida, 2002; 
Glaeser et al., 2001).10 We also argue that it is unlikely that these level variables directly 
impact on the likelihood of designation conditional on the unobserved heritage endowment 
in the fixed effects 𝜔𝑛.  
Another empirical concern is that, theoretically, a decrease in preferences for heritage must 
provoke a reduction of the designated area. The abolishment of CAs, however, is extremely 
rare in England so our data is left-censored (we do not observe increases in the share of 
non-designated land). Since we are interested in testing whether the mechanisms empha-
sized by the model are at work, and not simply the causal effect of changes in degree share 
on designation share, we take the model to the data using a Tobit approach: 
𝑌𝑛
∗ = ∆𝛼 − 𝜗 ∆log(𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑛) + ∆𝜀𝑛,       ∆𝜀𝑛~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)   (11) 
, where 𝑌𝑛
∗ = ∆log(1 − 𝐷𝑛) is a latent variable and the observed variable is defined as fol-
lows 
𝑌𝑛 = {
𝑌𝑛
∗, 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑛
∗ = ∆log(1 − 𝐷𝑛)  < 0 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑛
∗                                  ≥ 0
 (12) 
3.2  Equilibrium designation 
To test Hypothesis 2, that there will be a zero capitalisation effect inside and a positive effect 
outside newly designation CAs, we employ a combination of hedonic (Rosen, 1974) and dif-
ference-in-differences (DD) (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985) methods. We begin with a DD 
model that estimates the average designation effect within CAs and within areas near to 
conservations areas from a before-and-after comparison to various control groups. We then 
                                                             
10  Our measure of effective employment accessibility aggregates employment in surrounding re-
gions weighted by distance, as in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). Transport infrastructure is captured by a 
kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986) with a radius of 2km, which is considered to be the 
maximum distance people are willing to walk (Gibbons and Machin, 2005). 
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estimate a DD specification that allows for different price trends before and after the desig-
nation date in the treatment and control groups. One objective of this ‘time trend DD’ model 
is to deal with potential endogeneity driven by gentrification. Finally, we estimate a ‘dis-
tance gradient DD’ model that measures the treatment effect at different distances from the 
boundary both inside and outside the newly designated CAs. 
Difference-in-differences (DD) 
We define a group of 912 ‘treated’ CAs as those that were designated between 1996 and 
2010 to ensure we observe property transactions both before and after the designation 
date. Our counterfactuals are established via various control groups of housing units that 
are similar to the treated units but are themselves not treated. These control groups are 
discussed in more detail in the results section and in the appendix (section A3.2). 
Our baseline DD model takes the following form: 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (13) 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡  is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property 𝑖 in time period 𝑡. 𝐼𝑖 
is an internal treatment indicator, defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the observa-
tion is internal to a treated CA. 𝐸𝑖  is an external treatment indicator, similarly indicating 
observations just outside a treated CA within an area that is potentially exposed to spillo-
vers. While our standard models use a spillover area of 500m we also experiment with var-
ious alternative spatial specifications. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
transaction year t is equal to or greater than the designation year, X𝑖 is a vector of controls 
for property, neighbourhood and environmental characteristics, 𝑓𝑛 is a set of 𝑛 location 
fixed effects and 𝑌𝑡 are year effects. The 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 parameters give the difference-
in-differences estimates of the designation effect on the properties within and just outside 
a CA. We show in appendix 3.2 that 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  is equal to the net marginal policy (designation 
costs and benefits) effect while 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 reflects the pure (albeit spatially discounted) policy 
benefit. 
Time trend difference-in-differences 
The standard DD specification (13) identifies the policy treatment effect under some argu-
ably restrictive assumptions. Firstly, the treatment and control groups follow the same 
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trend before and after the treatment. Secondly, the treatment occurs at a singular and a 
priori known date and affects the level (and not the trend) of the outcome variable. These 
assumptions are evidently violated if the outcome variable does not respond immediately 
to the treatment, for example, because of costly arbitrage or in anticipation of the treatment, 
e.g. because of an investment motive by buyers. In our case, a positive pre-trend can also be 
associated with the gentrification that causes designation according to our theoretical 
model, a reverse causality problem. A positive pre-trend can also be associated with devel-
opment pressure, which could affect designation by reducing the preservation probability.  
To address these limitations of the standard DD we refine the model to accommodate dif-
ferences in trends across the treatment and the control group. Our linear time trend DD 
model takes the following form: 
where 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the number of years since the designation date, with the pre-designation years 
having negative values. We interact 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡 with 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 to allow the trend in the treatment 
group relative to the control groups to change after the designation date. In other specifica-
tions we use quadratic rather than linear trends and evaluate the fit of the parametric pol-
ynomial function using a semi-parametric version of (14) that replaces the 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡 variables 
with full sets of years-since-designation effects (details in appendix 3.2). 
Controlling for unobserved trends makes this functional form similar to a regression dis-
continuity design (RDD) with a time running variable (Anderson, 2014). Gentrification 
trends that may be endogenous to the treatment are expected to behave smoothly around 
the designation date. Only the designation itself changes abruptly at the designation date. 
Therefore, a significant ‘dis-in-diff’ parameter (𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 or 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) can be entirely attributed 
to the treatment even where the usual DD assumption of homogeneous trends is violated. 
Furthermore, if the assumption of homogeneous trends does hold then significant trend dif-
ferences (𝛽𝐼𝑌𝐷,𝛽𝐸𝑌𝐷, 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑌𝐷 or 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑌𝐷) describe designation effects that occur in antici-
pation or accumulate over time.  
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐼𝑌𝐷(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐸𝑌𝐷(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑌𝐷(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑌𝐷(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡) + X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(14) 
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Distance gradient difference-in-differences  
Our last empirical model estimates the treatment effect of designation at different distances 
from the CA boundaries as well as the discontinuity in the effect at the border itself. Esti-
mating the distance trend in treatment effects relaxes two of the abstractions from our the-
ory. Firstly, it relaxes the assumption that there is no spatial decay in heritage externali-
ties.11 We are able to detect the decline in external effects over distance and whether there 
are external effects that are spatially confined outside newly designated CAs. Similarly, we 
are able to detect whether there are positive effects towards the centre of a CA where the 
internal heritage density is greater. Secondly, it relaxes the assumption that marginal des-
ignations are infinitely small. In reality, there may be cases where a new CA corresponds to 
multiple zones in in our stylised model. In this case it would be the last zone, or the outer 
edge of the newly designated CA, where we would expect a zero effect.  
Estimating the discontinuity in the designation effect at the border allows us to test for the 
existence of the policy cost, in the spirit of an RDD with a boundary distance running varia-
ble (Gibbons et al., 2013). The policy benefits from designation are expected to decay 
smoothly across the CA boundary since these are based on the preservation of a visual 
amenity. Whilst the internal heritage benefit is expected to end suddenly at the border, it is 
time-invariant in the short-run and will be captured by a fixed effect. The policy costs from 
designation (property rights restrictions) are the only time-varying heritage-related effect 
that ends abruptly at the boundary. These will therefore be captured by the discontinuity 
parameter. The DD with spatial trends we estimate takes the following form:12 
                                                             
11 In reality heritage externalities are likely to decline quite steeply in distance (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 
2010; Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2015; Rossi‐Hansberg et al., 2010). 
12  In models with historical CAs as control groups the following terms are also included 
𝛽𝐶𝐷(𝐶𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽
𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐸𝐶𝐷(𝐸𝐶𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖), where 𝐶𝑖  indicates internal to control CA and 𝐸𝐶𝑖  exter-
nal to control CA. This ensures that spatial effects are estimated conditional on the spatial trends 
in control CA. 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐼𝐷(𝑇𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑇𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽
𝑂𝐷(𝑂𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽
𝑂𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑂𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝑂𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑂𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(15) 
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where 𝐷𝑖 is the distance from the property to the CA boundary (internal distances are neg-
ative values), 𝑂𝑖 indicates properties outside a treated CA and 𝑇𝑖 indicates the CA that is 
nearest to a property that was treated at any point of the study period. In order to fully 
explore the extent of spatial externalities 𝑂𝑖 indicates a larger area outside CAs rather than 
just within 500m as indicated by 𝐸𝑖  in previous models.13 As with the time trend DD speci-
fication we also estimate an expanded model specification in which we allow for quadratic 
distance trends and semi-nonparametric specifications replacing the distance variable with 
some distance bin effects. In this specification, the coefficient 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 gives the intercept of 
the internal effect (i.e. the internal effect at the boundary) and 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 estimates how this 
changes with respect to internal distance. Jointly, these terms capture the net policy costs 
and benefits of designation inside designated areas. A zero 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 coefficient would reflect 
a zero effect at the boundary and would be in line with the equilibrium condition derived in 
the theory section. A negative 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 would be in line with the existence of policy benefits 
(due to increased preservation probability) that spill over with decay. The parameters 
𝛽𝑂𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝛽𝑂𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 allow for a spatial discontinuity in the treatment effect at the boundary 
and heterogeneity in spatial trends inside and outside the treated areas. As with 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, a 
jointly negative 𝛽𝐼𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑂𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 would be in line with the decaying policy benefits exter-
nal to the CA. The discontinuity at the border is measured by the external intercept term 
𝛽𝑂𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. A statistically significant positive estimate would indicate a cost of the policy (inside 
CAs). A jointly positive effect of 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑂𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 would in turn indicate the existence of policy 
benefits (outside CAs).  
4 Data 
We have compiled two distinct data sets for the two stages of the empirical analysis. Both 
data sets make use of data provided by English Heritage. These include a precise Geograph-
ical Information System (GIS) map of 8,167 CAs in England, the Conservation Areas Survey 
containing information on community support and risk status (average condition, vulnera-
bility and trajectory of a CA) and a complete register of listed buildings. 
For the analysis of the determinants of designation we use UK census wards as a unit of 
analysis. Shares of designated land within each census ward are computed in GIS. Various 
                                                             
13  Specifically, the empirical analysis uses properties within 1,400m of the treated CA.  
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ward level data on educational level, age, ethnical background, average household size and 
homeownership status and vacancy rate were obtained from the UK census. Any changes in 
ward boundaries between the years were corrected for using the online conversion tool 
GeoConvert.14 For robustness tests we also collected a measure of the ward’s average in-
come (Experian). The instrumental variables station density and employment potential are 
created using data from nomis (workplace employment) and the Ordinance Survey (rail sta-
tions). The average turnover in housing is approximated as the number of properties trans-
acted per year in a ward as recorded in the Nationwide Building Society data set (see below). 
For the analysis of the capitalisation effects of designation we use transactions data related 
to mortgages granted by the Nationwide Building Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. 
The data for England comprise 1,088,446 observations and include the price paid for indi-
vidual housing units along with detailed property characteristics. These characteristics in-
clude floor space (m²), the type of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, bungalow or ter-
raced), the date of construction, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage or parking 
facilities and the type of heating. There is also some buyer information including the type of 
mortgage (freehold or leasehold) and whether they are a first-time buyer. Importantly, the 
transaction data includes the full UK postcode of the property sold, allowing it to be assigned 
to grid-reference coordinates.  
With this information it is possible within GIS to calculate distances to CA borders and to 
determine whether the property lies inside or outside these borders. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible to calculate distances and other spatial measures (e.g. densities) for the amenities and 
environmental characteristics such as National Parks, as well as natural features like lakes, 
rivers and coastline. The postcode reference also allows us to observe a merger of transac-
tions and various household characteristics (median income and ethnic composition) from 
the UK census, natural land cover and land use, various amenities such as access to employ-
ment opportunities, cultural and entertainment establishments and school quality. A more 
detailed description of all the data used is in the appendix (section 4.1). 
                                                             
14  Available at: http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/ 
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5 Empirical results 
5.1  Designation process 
Table 1 reports the results of our Tobit model of the designation process defined in equa-
tions (10–12). The non-instrumented baseline model is in column (1). As predicted by our 
theory, increases in educational levels that are presumably correlated with heritage prefer-
ences are associated with reductions in the share of non-designated land. More precisely, 
an increase in the degree share by 1% is associated with a 0.12% reduction in the share of 
non-designated land. This decrease corresponds to a 0.12% × (1 − ?̅?𝑡−1)/?̅?𝑡−1 = 2.61% in-
crease in the share of designated land for a ward with the mean of the positive initial desig-
nation share ?̅?𝑡−1 = 4.4%. The effect substantially increases once we instrument the change 
in degree share using rail station density and employment potential (column 2). This in-
crease is in line with unobserved (positive) deterioration trends that a) increase the likeli-
hood of designation and b) are negatively correlated with changes in degree share. Intro-
ducing the instruments, the effect of a 1% increase in degree share on the share of non-
designated land increases to 0.88%, which for a ward with the mean initial designation 
share ?̅?𝑡−1 corresponds to an increase in the designated land share of approximately 19%. 
While we have argued that our estimates are supposed to reflect a causal estimate of gen-
trification (proxied by degree shares) on designation probabilities and not necessarily a 
causal effect of degree share on heritage preferences, a parameter estimate of ?̂? = 0.88 is at 
least indicative of heritage preferences increasing relatively steeply in education.  It is nota-
ble that increases in the share of designated land are also positively correlated with high 
initial levels of degree shares. 
The remaining columns in Table 1 provide variations of the benchmark model (2). We add 
TTWA effects to control for unobserved institutional heterogeneity in column (3). Column 
(4) adds several CA characteristics that capture historic quality (e.g. number of listed build-
ings), risk (e.g. various measures capturing vulnerability and trajectory, which may affect 
the preservation probability) and development pressure (e.g. vacancy rate). The latter in-
cludes a measure of property price appreciation, which we obtain from ward-level regres-
sions of log property prices on a time trend (and property controls, see appendix section 3.1 
for details). With this variable we control for a potentially positive correlation between 
owners’ risk aversion and the value of their properties – typically their largest assets. This 
is a potentially important control since a larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a 
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policy that increases certainty regarding the future of the neighbourhood and, thus, poten-
tially increases the optimal designation share. It is a demanding control since positive price 
trends are potentially endogenous to changes in neighbourhood composition and may thus 
absorb some of the gentrification effect on designation. Model (5) replicates the benchmark 
model on a reduced sample of predominantly residential wards to ensure that the results 
are not driven by commercial agents, which we do not model in our theory.15  None of these 
model alterations changes the education effect substantially. Model (6) tests for an interac-
tion effect between homeownership rate and degree share. We find that the (positive) im-
pact of neighbourhood change on designation shares (interaction term) is particularly large 
in high homeownership areas (see column 6). This is in line with a political economy litera-
ture that suggests that homeowners tend to form well-organised interest groups (e.g. 
Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2015; Brunner and Sonstelie, 2003; Dehring et al., 2008; Fischel, 
2001a). 
The results in Table 1 offer some further interesting insights on the potential determinants 
of designation. We do not find evidence in support of contagion effects in designation, i.e. 
designated land shares do not tend to increase where shares were initially high. The likeli-
hood of designation rises with ward population age, which could be related to a higher ap-
preciation of heritage by the elderly. The likelihood declines in the share of foreigners, 
which could likewise reflect a lower appreciation among people with different cultural 
backgrounds. An alternative and potentially complementary explanation may be a lack of 
familiarity with the institutional context and, thus, a difficulty with `gaming the system’. 
Further robustness 
While our IVs comfortably pass the typical statistical tests, we experiment with four alter-
native sets of IVs. We also split up the 1991–2011 long difference into two shorter differ-
ences (1991–2001 and 2001–2011), use the change in income as a proxy for heritage pref-
erences (for 2001–2011) and run the baseline model in OLS, keeping only observations with 
positive changes in shares of designated land. The results are presented in the appendix 
(section 5.2) and support those discussed here. 
                                                             
15 In the results reported we drop wards with more workers than inhabitants, which amount to about 
7.4% of the total sample. The results do not change qualitatively even if we drop the top quintile 
according to the same metric. 
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Tab. 1.  Designation process 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit 
 Δ log share non designated land (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) (𝜗) -0.112*** 
(0.022) 
-0.875*** 
(0.105) 
-0.754*** 
(0.136) 
-0.794*** 
(0.100) 
-0.874*** 
(0.100) 
-0.871*** 
(0.103) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.116*** 
(0.012) 
-0.426*** 
(0.043) 
-0.401*** 
(0.060) 
-0.394*** 
(0.042) 
-0.438*** 
(0.042) 
-0.403*** 
(0.041) 
log designation share (t-
1) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Δ log homeownership (t) 0.207*** 
(0.034) 
0.618*** 
(0.067) 
0.563*** 
(0.082) 
0.582*** 
(0.073) 
0.658*** 
(0.070) 
0.530*** 
(0.061) 
log homeownership (t-1) 0.134*** 
(0.020) 
0.195*** 
(0.023) 
0.208*** 
(0.026) 
0.220*** 
(0.029) 
0.238*** 
(0.027) 
0.588*** 
(0.065) 
Δ log average household 
size (t) 
0.037 
(0.050) 
-0.336*** 
(0.074) 
-0.205** 
(0.082) 
-0.346*** 
(0.076) 
-0.454*** 
(0.086) 
-0.121 
(0.074) 
log average household 
size (t-1) 
-0.027 
(0.058) 
-0.304*** 
(0.074) 
-0.289*** 
(0.082) 
-0.376*** 
(0.077) 
-0.229*** 
(0.078) 
-0.353*** 
(0.076) 
Δ log pop age (t) -0.014 
(0.068) 
-0.277*** 
(0.081) 
-0.214** 
(0.084) 
-0.332*** 
(0.091) 
-0.477*** 
(0.100) 
-0.078 
(0.084) 
log pop age (t-1) -0.109*** 
(0.055) 
-0.252*** 
(0.062) 
-0.275*** 
(0.068) 
-0.288*** 
(0.074) 
-0.232*** 
(0.066) 
-0.263*** 
(0.063) 
Δ log share of foreigners 
(t) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.075*** 
(0.015) 
0.066*** 
(0.017) 
0.074*** 
(0.015) 
0.071*** 
(0.015) 
0.051*** 
(0.014) 
log of share of fore (t-1) -0.003 
(0.007) 
0.079*** 
(0.013) 
0.051*** 
(0.016) 
0.079*** 
(0.013) 
0.083*** 
(0.013) 
0.071*** 
(0.012) 
log price trend  
 
 
 
 
 
0.017 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
 
Δ log vacancy rate (t)  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
  
 
log vacancy rate (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
  
 
log turnover in housing    -0.007 
(0.006) 
  
log listed buildings den-
sity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
  
 
log of share of building 
from pre1945 
   -0.021*** 
(0.006) 
  
average condition (1 best, 
4 worst) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.069*** 
(0.020) 
  
 
average vulnerability 
score (1 low, 8 high) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.052*** 
(0.019) 
  
 
average trajectory score 
(-2 improving, +2 de-
teriorating) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.037 
(0.038) 
  
 
Δ log degree share (t) x 
homeownership (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
-0.953*** 
(0.138) 
Constant 0.490** 
(0.235) 
1.470*** 
(0.286) 
1.565*** 
(0.323) 
1.801*** 
(0.360) 
1.351*** 
(0.300) 
1.724*** 
(0.299) 
TTWA Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Residential wards only NO NO NO NO YES NO 
CHI2 - 328.334 617.186 491.909 312.116 332.841 
EXOG_P - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OVERID - 0.001 - 0.435 5.805 0.242 
OVERIDP - 0.981 - 0.509 0.016 0.623 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7965 7379 7965 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. First-stage results are in Table A5. IVs are 
station density, employment potential and the degree share in 1981 in all models except model (1). 
Model (4) includes a dummy variable indicating 60 wards for which no price trend could be com-
puted due to insufficient transactions (trends are set to zero). Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 
0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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5.2 Equilibrium designation 
Difference-in-differences 
Table 2 shows the results from an estimation of the standard DD equation (13) for different 
selections of control groups and fixed effects. Each model includes controls for property, 
location and neighbourhood characteristics, year effects and location fixed effects to hold 
unobserved time-invariant effects constant. Column (1) is a naïve DD using the mean price 
trend of all properties located beyond 500m of a treated CA as a counterfactual. Columns 
(2) to (7) provide more credible counterfactuals by restricting the control group to proper-
ties that are presumably similar to the treated properties. Column (2), with ward fixed ef-
fects, and (3), with nearest CA fixed effects, provide a spatial matching by restricting the 
sample to properties within 2km of a treated CA, where many unobserved location charac-
teristics are likely to be similar. In column (4) we impose the additional restriction that 
properties in the control group must fall within 500m of the boundaries of a historically 
designated CA (before 1996), which increases the likelihood of unobserved property char-
acteristics being similar. While areas that are designated at any point in time are likely to 
share many similarities, the diminishing returns to designation in our theoretical frame-
work also imply that heritage-richer areas should generally be designated first. To evaluate 
whether the designation date of the treated CAs, relative to those in the control groups, in-
fluences the DD estimate, we define CAs designated 1996–2002 as a treatment group and 
form control groups based on CAs designated just before (1987–1994) or right after (2003–
2010) in columns (5) and (6). Finally, in column (7) we use environmental, property and 
neighbourhood characteristics to estimate the propensity of being in a treated (1996–2010) 
CA over a historical (<1996) CA. Then the treated CAs are matched to their ‘nearest-neigh-
bour’, i.e. the most similar non-treated CA, based on the estimated propensity score 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). A fixed effect is defined for each treated CA and its nearest-
neighbour control CA such that the treatment effect is estimated by the direct comparison 
between the treated CA and its nearest neighbour. 
We anticipate that the strength of the counterfactual increases as we match the treatment 
and control group based on proximity (2 & 3), proximity and qualifying for designation (4, 
5 & 6) and qualifying for designation and a combination of various observable characteris-
tics (7). As the credibility of the counterfactual increases, the statistical significance of the 
treatment effect tends to decrease. Benchmarked against the nationwide property price 
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trend both the internal effect (Inside × Post) and the external effect (Within 500m × Post) 
are significant at the 5% level. The magnitudes of these effects are of similar size, implying 
a 2.8% premium for houses inside newly designated CAs and a 2.3% premium outside. The 
spatial matching (2 & 3) renders the internal treatment effect insignificant (2 & 3). With 
further refinements in the matching procedure the external effect also becomes insignifi-
cant. Table 2 results, thus, suggest that designation does not lead to significant property 
price adjustments. Evidence is weak for positive (policy) spillovers to nearby areas. 
Tab. 2. Conservation area premium – designation effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 log property transaction price 
Inside treated CA × Post 
designation 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.024 
(0.070) 
-0.077 
(0.111) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA × Post des. 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Inside treated CA -0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
-0.062 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.108) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighborhood cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES - - - - - 
Nearest treat. CA effects - - YES YES YES YES - 
Matched CA effects - - - - - - YES 
Treatment group:  
CAs designated 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2010 
Control group Full Eng-
land 
sample 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA desig-
nated be-
fore 1996 
& within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA des-
ignated 
1987-
1995 & 
within 
4km of 
treated 
CA  
Within 
500m of 
CA des-
ignated 
2003-
2010 & 
within 
4km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-
1996 CA 
matched 
on pro-
pensity 
score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.915 0.861 0.864 0.909 
AIC -587,375 -156,426 -130,469 -67,046 -5,408 -8,475 -41,184 
Observation 1,088k 302k 302k 178k 21k 32k 133k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control 
groups in columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas inside and outside a CA. * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time trend DD 
In total, we estimate 10 versions of the time trend DD specification outlined in equation 
(14). These include models that feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–10) trends and sev-
eral of the control groups utilised in Table 2. Below, we provide a discussion of the general 
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theme emerging from these models, but relegate the full set of parametric estimates to Table 
A11 in the appendix to save space.  
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the predicted effect of being in the treatment 
group over the control group against years-since-designation. Figure 2 provides an analog-
ical illustration of the external treatment effect, i.e. the spillovers onto areas adjacent to the 
designated CAs. A horizontal red line is drawn at the mean of the pre-treatment effects in 
order to illustrate the differences between the time trend DD results and those of the stand-
ard DD.  
With respect to our theory, there are two key insights that emerge from the results reported 
in those figures. Evidence of a discontinuity in the price trend at the time of designation is 
weak, in particular within CAs. However, there seems to be a positive shift in price trends 
after designation within CAs as well as areas near to CAs. With respect to functional form 
those figures suggest that the linear and quadratic forms used in the parametric DD esti-
mates (black lines) are generally supported by the more flexible semi-parametric estimates 
for the ‘years-since-designation bins’ (grey dots).16  
These results are generally in line with the broader evidence emerging from a comparison 
of the parametric estimates across all specifications. Across the 10 specifications we esti-
mate (see Table A11 in the appendix) the external (Within 500m × Post) ‘dis-in-diff’ param‐
eter estimate is significant in four of 10 specifications at the 5% level and in one half of the 
specifications at the 10% level. The internal (Inside × Post) parameter is only significant in 
one specification at the 10% level (column 8). Despite the flexibility in pre- and post-trends 
the ‘dis-in-diff’ parameter is near to zero in virtually all models. This suggests primarily that 
there exists a significant treatment effect exactly at the treatment date only for the external 
area. This interpretation is in line with the predictions of our theoretical model. The positive 
change in the internal price trend after a CA has been designated (Inside treated CA × Post 
designation × Years designated) is significant at the 5% level in seven of the 10 models. This 
may be regarded as evidence of a cumulative internal effect of the designation policy. There 
is also a faster appreciation in the external area post-designation that is significant in four 
of the 10 models.  
                                                             
16  Confidence bands for the semi-parametric ‘bins’ model are presented in appendix Figure A3. 
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In short, the time trend DD confirms that the designation policy causes no immediate effect 
inside the CA but shows instead that it increases the speed of price appreciation over time. 
The time trend DD also uncovers that areas external to the CA receive an immediate shift in 
prices at the designation date in line with our theoretical hypothesis. 
Fig. 1. DD effects with time trends: Internal estimates 
Nearest treated CA (linear trends)  
Table A11, column (4) 
 
Matched CA (linear trends) 
Table A11, column (5) 
 
Nearest treated CA (quadratic trends)  
Table A11, column (9) 
 
Matched CA (quadratic trends) 
Table A11, column (10) 
 
Note:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Table A11 and 
estimated using equation (14). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using 
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken and West (1991). The grey 
dots plot the point estimates of ‘years-since-designation bins’ effects obtained from separate regres-
sion described and presented in more detail in the appendix. The horizontal red line illustrates the 
mean of the pre-treatment estimates. 
Ahlfeldt/Möller/Waights/Wendland: Game of zones 25 
Fig. 2. DD effects with time trends: External estimates 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (linear trends)  
Table A11, column (4) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)  
Table A11, column (5) 
 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (quadratic trends) 
Table A11, column (9) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)  
Table A11, column (10) 
 
Notes:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Table A11 and 
estimated using equation (14). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using 
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented Aiken and West (1991). The grey dots 
plot the point estimates of ‘years-since-designation bins’ effects obtained from separate regression 
described and presented in more detail in the appendix. The horizontal red line illustrates the mean 
of the pre-treatment estimates. 
Distance gradient DD 
As with the time trend DD, we estimate 10 versions of the distance gradient DD model (spec-
ification 15) that feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–10) trends and several of the control 
groups utilised in Table 2. Again, we summarise the evidence here and report all parametric 
estimates in the appendix (Table A12).  
Figure 3 illustrates the designation effect at varying (internal and external) distances from 
the CA boundary. One interesting feature of Figure 3 is a positive shift in the designation 
effect that arises as one crosses the boundary from the inside to the outside of CAs. This 
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positive shift is suggestive of a policy cost that exists inside CAs but not outside. We find a 
positive discontinuity coefficient (Outside × Post) in all 10 models we estimate, although the 
parameter is always statistically insignificant. In none of the models is the designation effect 
just inside the boundary significantly positive, which is in line with our predictions for cap-
italisation effects under equilibrium designation policy and a spatial decay in heritage ex-
ternalities. With the strongest control groups (matched pre-1996 CA) the effect is not only 
statistically but also economically insignificant. In contrast, there is at least one estimate 
that points to a positive and significant (at 5% level) 1.6% effect just outside the CA as pre-
dicted by our theory (bottom-left panel in Figure 3). While the effect is only significant 
within 100m of the CA boundary, this is precisely where we expect a positive effect in a 
world with spatial decay in heritage (housing) externalities.  
Fig. 3. DD effects with spatial trends 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (linear trends)  
Table A12, column (4) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)  
Table A12, column (5) 
 
Pre-1996 CA within 2km (quadratic trends)  
Table A12, column (9) 
 
Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)  
Table A12, column (10) 
 
Notes:  The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Table A12 and 
estimated using equation (15). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using 
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken and West (1991). 
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Figure 3, more generally, is suggestive of a localised heritage character as the treatment 
effect increases towards the centre for the CA and decreases in external distance to the 
boundary. The designation effect becomes zero after about 700m at the latest, which is in 
line with existing evidence of a relatively steep decay in heritage and housing externalities 
(Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2010; Lazrak et al., 2013; Rossi‐Hansberg et al., 2010).  
Briefly summarised, the results of the distance gradient DD yields estimates that are quali-
tatively consistent with our theory, even though the statistical significance, overall, is mar-
ginal at best. Yet it seems fair to conclude that across the treated CAs owners – at least on 
average – are not harmed by designation. There is some evidence that owners just outside 
a CA receive some benefit.  
6 Conclusion 
Historic preservation policies are among the most restrictive planning policies used to over-
come coordination problems in the housing market internationally. These policies aim at 
increasing social welfare at the cost of constraining individual property rights. From the 
perspective of owners of properties in conservation areas (CA), the policy may help to solve 
a collective action problem, preventing owners from freeriding on the heritage character of 
nearby buildings while inappropriately altering their own property. If property owners 
value the heritage character of nearby buildings and can influence the designation process 
they will seek out a (local) level of designation where the marginal costs of designation 
equate the marginal benefits. An increase in the marginal benefit of designation will lead to 
an increase in designation activity. If the planner acts on behalf of the local owners, addi-
tional designations in a neighbourhood will not lead to an adverse impact on those being 
designated.  
We provide evidence that is supportive of this scenario using two empirical approaches that 
follow from a simple model of equilibrium CA designation. First, we present a neighbour-
hood level IV Tobit analysis that reveals a positive impact of an increase in degree share, 
which is presumably (positively) correlated with heritage preferences, on the share of des-
ignated land. Gentrification, by increasing the value of neighbourhood stability to local own-
ers, can cause designation. Second, we use variations of the difference-in-differences (DD) 
method to estimate temporally and spatially variant capitalisation effects of designation on 
newly designated areas as well as spillovers to adjacent areas. These methods qualify more 
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generally as a useful tool for programme evaluations where a treatment is suspected to lead 
to an impact on (spatial or temporal) trends and discontinuities. Within newly designated 
CAs we find no significant short-run effects of designation and some evidence of positive 
capitalisation effects in the long run. There is some evidence of positive spillovers onto 
properties just outside. 
These results suggest that the policy is either deliberately adhering to the interests of local 
owners or, as suggested in the literature on the political economy of housing markets, home-
owners are able to successfully influence the outcome of local policies in their interest. It is 
therefore unlikely that the policy is welfare-maximising on a wider geographic scale. De-
pending on the general restrictiveness of the planning system, historic preservation may 
constrain housing supply and generate welfare losses. The net welfare effect to a wider 
housing market area is an interesting and important question that we leave to future re-
search. 
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Technical appendix to Game of zones:  
The political economy of conservation areas 
1 Introduction 
This appendix complements the main paper and is not designed to stand alone or as a replace-
ment. We order the sections in this appendix analogically to the sections in the main paper to 
facilitate cross-referencing. Section 2 provides a less technical discussion of how a planner deter-
mines the designation share and adds to the theory section of the main paper. Section 3 comple-
ments the empirical strategy section of the main paper by providing a more detailed discussion of 
the control variables in the Tobit designation process models. The section also links the reduced 
form difference-in-differences parameters to the marginal policy effect in the theoretical model. 
Section 4 provides a detailed overview of the data we use, its sources and how they are processed. 
Finally, section 5 complements the empirical results section of the main paper by showing the 
extended estimation outputs and results of a variety of robustness tests and model alterations not 
reported in the main paper for brevity. 
2 Theory and context 
2.1  Theoretical framework 
This section provides an intuitive discussion of how a planner determines the designation share. 
Figure A1 illustrates a linear neighbourhood in which the heritage endowment of each zone de-
clines in the distance from the neighbourhood centre, the nucleus of the development of the neigh-
bourhood. For simplicity, we assume a linear decay, but the exact functional form is not crucial for 
the model implications: ℎ(𝑥) = ℎ̅(1 − 𝑥), where ℎ0 is the heritage level at the centre. At any loca-
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tion x in the neighbourhood the expected preserved heritage is ℎ̅(1 − 𝑥) 𝜋. The preservation prob-
ability is 𝜋 < 1 if a zone is not designated because detrimental redevelopments over time affect 
the expected heritage character of the neighbourhood. The effect of the preservation policy is 
simply to increase the expected heritage to ℎ̅(1 − 𝑥) at all locations 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝐷, because no detri-
mental redevelopments can take place within the protected area. The expected external heritage 
𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] (defined as H in the main paper to save space) without preservation is indicated by the 
grey-shaded area in Figure A1. The expected amount of external heritage saved by the preserva-
tion policy is illustrated as the black-dotted area ?̌? which denotes the difference in (expected) 
external heritage between a scenario with no designation and a scenario with a designation share 
𝐷. Because the heritage distribution is downward sloping it is immediately obvious that additional 
designations will increase the preserved external heritage at a decreasing rate. Figure A1, thus, 
intuitively establishes one of the stylised facts of our theory, that the social marginal benefits of 
designation are downward sloping.   
Fig A1. Expected heritage distribution with partial designation 
 
Notes:  The function ℎ(𝑥) gives the internal heritage at each zone in the neighbourhood. The expected external her-
itage is equal to the grey-shaded area and is the integral of ℎ(𝑥) up to the designation share plus the integral 
of 𝜋 times this ℎ(𝑥) from the designation share until the neighbourhood limit at 𝑥 = 1. The stippled area 
marked ?̌? is the amount of expected external heritage preserved by the policy. 
The downward sloping social marginal benefits (MB) function is depicted in Figure A2. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the marginal costs (MC) of designation are constant, i.e. the cost of not 
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being allowed to redevelop the own house according to changing needs is the same for everyone. 
At point A, the designation share D adheres to local homeowner interests. The representative 
homeowner in each zone along x is happy with the designation status of their zone. However, this 
is not a (local) welfare-maximising equilibrium since further extension to B would benefit all own-
ers in zones to the left of A and to the right of B as they would profit from increasing the expected 
heritage in the neighbourhood without experiencing a change in marginal cost. In zones between 
A and B, however, the social marginal benefit would also increase, but the increase would not 
compensate for the private marginal costs associated with a change in the designation status from 
undesignated to designated. Thus, if the planner cannot compensate owners between A and B be-
cause such transfer policies do not exist (such as in England), the planner chooses A as a second-
best policy for the neighbourhood (this solution ignores demand for heritage from outside the 
neighbourhood and supply effects to the wider housing market area). 
Fig A2. Designation equilibrium 
 
If there is, however, a change in preferences and residents develop a greater taste for external 
heritage 𝛾, e.g. because of gentrification, the marginal benefits curve shifts to the right. The plan-
ner adapts to this situation and raises the designation share to set marginal benefits equal to mar-
ginal costs again. This new equilibrium is illustrated by point B where the designation share in-
creases to D’. 
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3 Empirical strategy 
3.1  Designation process – control variables 
This section provides a detailed description and motivation of the control variables we use to ac-
count for the determinants of conservation area (CA) designation that are unrelated to the mech-
anisms modelled in our theory. In particular, we try to control for composition effects, neighbour-
hood sorting, heterogeneity in terms of homeownership and whether the heritage in a neighbour-
hood is at particular risk.  
We add the initial period (1991) degree share for two reasons. First, we assume that the highly 
educated derive higher (net-)benefits from neighbourhood heritage. To the extent that this group 
is capable of more efficiently articulating their will in a political bargaining a higher degree share 
will make the designation more likely. It is important to control for the initial degree share since 
levels and changes may be correlated in either direction. On the one hand there may be catch-up 
growth in the degree share of less educated regions, i.e. mean reversion. On the other hand, people 
with degrees may be more likely to move to areas with an already high share of people with de-
grees, which would imply a self-reinforcing process leading to spatial segregation.  
We also include a control for the extent of designation in the initial period (1991). The share of 
designated land area in the total ward area would be (positively) correlated with the change in 
the designation share if designations spark further designations as in a contagion model. Initial 
designation also helps to control for the possibility that the skilled may be attracted to areas with 
a lot of designated land. To avoid a mechanic relationship between the dependent variable and 
the lagged designation share we instrument designation in the initial period (1991) by its lagged 
value, i.e. the designation share in 1981. 
Another set of controls is driven by the interest in homeowners within the designation process. 
Homeowners experience extra benefits/costs from designation since, unlike renters, they are not 
compensated for changes in neighbourhood quality by increases in rents. Homeowners thus have 
additional incentives to engage in political bargaining. Similar to the other controls, homeowner-
ship status enters in lagged levels and differences. In a final specification we also add an interac-
tion of the logged change in degree with homeownership (rescaled to a zero mean to make coef-
ficients comparable). We use average household size (both in differences and lagged levels) be-
cause larger households are more likely to lobby against designation and the resulting constraint 
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on available floor space. We control for further neighbourhood characteristics by including aver-
age population age and the share of foreigners inside a ward (also both in differences and lagged 
levels). We expect older residents to have a stronger appreciation of heritage, making it more 
likely that they would lobby for designation. Conversely, a high share of foreigners is expected to 
be negatively correlated with designation. Foreigners, on average, might not know the planning 
system that well and may perhaps find it more difficult to form interest groups. Moreover, they 
might value English heritage differently due to their cultural background. 
A larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a policy that increases certainty regarding the 
future of the neighbourhood and, thus, potentially increases the optimal designation share. To 
control for a potentially positive correlation between owners’ risk aversion and the value of their 
properties – typically their largest assets – we add a measure of neighbourhood appreciation. We 
generate ward-level property price trends in n separate auxiliary regressions of the following 
type: 
where X is a vector of property and neighbourhood characteristics and T is a linear time trend. To 
avoid a reverse effect of designation on the property price trend we only consider transactions 
that occur outside CAs.  
A second set of controls deals with potential development risk. Areas that experience develop-
ment pressure or are in poor and/or declining condition may be more likely to be designated in 
order to protect against the threats to the heritage character of the neighbourhood. We use the 
vacancy rate, a density measure of listed buildings, housing turnover, the share of buildings pre-
1945 as well as score measures for a CA’s condition, vulnerability and trajectory provided by Eng-
lish Heritage to capture development pressure. We expect that neighbourhoods with few vacan-
cies will be put under higher development pressure. Vacancies enter the specification both in dif-
ferences and lagged levels. The reason for the differenced term is that a change in development 
pressure is likely to lead to a change in designation status as a result. We argue that the lagged 
level may also capture changes (not just levels) in development pressure. As an example, it seems 
likely that general population growth would put greater development pressure on neighbour-
hoods with lower vacancy rates. By using the total number of houses sold between 1995 and 2010 
we introduce an alternative measure of development pressure. The share of houses built before 
log(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑛) = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑏𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑛 
 
(A1) 
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1945 serves as an indicator of potential heritage. If we are not in a steady state, building age could 
affect the change in designation share. The score measures reflect the development risk inside a 
CA and come from a survey provided by English Heritage. The higher the condition score, the 
worse the heritage conditions. A higher vulnerability and a higher trajectory are also indicated by 
higher scores. Except for the score variables, all control variables enter our empirical specification 
in logs. 
While taking first-differences of the empirical specification will remove all time-invariant ward-
specific effects that might impact on the level of designation (including the heritage itself), it will 
not help if there are location-specific effects that impact on the changes in designation status. For 
example, if there is heterogeneity across Local Authorities (LAs) about how difficult or easy it is 
to designate, arising from different bureaucratic practices, then this would affect changes in des-
ignation for all wards within a particular LA. We therefore estimate a fixed effects specification 
for the 166 English Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs). The TTWAs are designed to approximate city 
regions, which can be described as somehow self-contained economic areas, from a job market 
perspective. By applying a TTWA fixed effect model we are therefore able to control for unob-
served socio-economic heterogeneity across TTWAs.  
3.2  Difference-in-differences 
This section motivates the difference-in-differences approach for the estimation of the marginal 
policy effect. Firstly, in a simple cross-sectional hedonic estimation we illustrate how the policy 
and heritage effects are difficult to disentangle. Secondly, we lay out how the difference-in-differ-
ences treatment effect is used to estimate the marginal policy effect laid out in terms of the struc-
tural parameters of our model.  
Cross-sectional hedonics 
Let us assume a parametric Cobb-Douglas utility function as in section 3.1 in the main paper:  
𝑈(𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥)𝑒𝜑ℎ(𝑥)𝑒𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝑒−𝑐?̃?(𝑥)𝑋𝛿𝐿1−𝛿, where ℎ(𝑥) is the internal heritage endowment (i.e. 
heritage character of the specific housing unit), 𝜑 is the internal heritage preference parameter, 
𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] is the external heritage (i.e. expected heritage of surrounding units, which depends on the 
designation policy, defined as H in the main paper to save space) and is conditional on the desig-
nation share as defined above. 𝛾 is the external heritage preference parameter and 𝑐 represents 
the costs of designation policies which arise from the development restrictions imposed inside 
CAs. The cost to a representative individual is 𝑒−𝑐?̃?(𝑥) and depends on their zone’s designation 
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status ?̃?(𝑥), a binary function of 𝑥 which takes the value of one if 𝑥 ≤ 𝐷 and zero otherwise (more 
generally defined as 𝑐(𝑥 ≤ 𝐷) in the main paper). Utility maximisation and a reservation utility 
level of ?̅? = 1 due to perfect spatial competition imply an equilibrium bid rent for a representative 
homeowner 𝜃(𝑥) = (1 − 𝛿)[𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑎(𝑥)𝑒𝜑ℎ(𝑥)𝑒𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝑒−𝑐?̃?(𝑥)]
1
1−𝛿, or, in logs:1 
The following heritage and policy effects determine the bid rent: 
Consider the cross-sectional reduced form equation: 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡  is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property 𝑖 in time period 𝑡, 𝐼𝑖 is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a treated CA, X𝑖 is a vector of controls 
for property, neighbourhood and environmental characteristics, 𝑓𝑛 is a set of 𝑛 location fixed ef-
fects and 𝑌𝑡 are year effects. The coefficient ℵ on the 𝐶𝐴𝑖  dummy identifies the policy cost associ-
ated with the location of a property inside a CA ?̃?(𝑥) = 1. The policy cost should have a negative 
effect on logged house prices. The coefficient also partly identifies the internal heritage effect. Spe-
cifically, it identifies the value of the difference between the mean internal heritage inside CAs and 
the mean internal heritage outside CAs (i.e. 𝜑/(1 − 𝛿)(ℎ𝐶𝐴𝑖=1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − ℎ𝐶𝐴𝑖=0
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )). This should be positive 
because the policymaker would normally designate areas that have the most heritage. Finally, un-
der the existence of some spatial decay in externalities, it also identifies the value of the difference 
inside and outside CAs in the external heritage effect (i.e. 𝛾(1 − 𝛿)(𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝐶𝐴𝑖=1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝐶𝐴𝑖=0
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )). 
This is a function of internal heritage and will therefore also be positive. 
                                                             
1 Where 𝜏 is a constant and equal to: ln(1 − 𝛿) +
𝛿
1−𝛿
ln 𝛿 +
1
1−𝛿
ln 𝑊. 
ln 𝜃(𝑥) = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎(𝑥) +
𝜑ℎ(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
+
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
−
𝑐?̃?(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 (A2) 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝑐?̃?(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 (A3) 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
 (A4) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =
𝜑ℎ(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 (A5) 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ℵ𝐼𝑖 + X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (A6) 
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The coefficient ℵ thus reflects a composite effect of policy costs, policy benefits and correlated 
internal heritage effect. Furthermore, in reality the actual distribution of internal heritage is un-
known and there is likely a spatial decay to externalities, further complicating the estimate.2 In 
practice, ℵ will also be affected by unobserved neighbourhood characteristics that are correlated 
with the distance to the CA. A positive ℵ parameter, at best, tells us only that the overall higher 
levels of heritage (internal and external) combined with the policy benefits of conservation out-
weigh the policy costs. This does not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the policy effect itself. 
To try and disentangle these effects we implement a different empirical approach. 
Difference-in-differences 
Using the difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the marginal effect of a change in 
designation status offers an improved identification.  
Our empirical difference-in-differences specification is equation (13) from the main paper:  
Table A1 illustrates the conditional mean prices (after controlling for time effects) for the treat-
ment and control group in the pre- and post-treatment periods. It is important to note that the 
year fixed effects 𝑌𝑡 capture the general development of prices over time. Without this feature it 
would be necessary to control for the overall growth in price between the pre- and post-treatment 
periods via the inclusion of a non-interacted version of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡. 
Tab. A1. Interpretation of DD parameters 
Conditional mean of prices Pre Post 
Treated (Internal) ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽𝐼 ?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝛽𝐼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  
Control ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 0 ?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 0 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) − (?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = ([𝛽𝐼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡] − [𝛽𝐼]) − ([0] − [0]) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  
Notes: The conditional mean of prices in the treatment group in the pre-period is denoted ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡. This represents 
the log of prices conditional on fixed and year effects (𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡) and controls X𝑖. The same notation is used for 
the other groups. 
                                                             
2 In a general case the estimate would be equal to: 
ℵ =
𝜑
1 − 𝛿
(ℎ𝐶𝐴𝑖=1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − ℎ𝐶𝐴𝑖=0
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) +
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
(𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝐶𝐴𝑖=1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]𝐶𝐴𝑖=0
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) +
𝑐
1 − 𝛿
 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝐼𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐸𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐸𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (A7) 
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Our treatment coefficient 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 essentially differentiates across the treatment and control groups 
before and after designation and is thus defined as follows: 
Let us assume that the relationship between the observed conditional mean and the theoretical 
bid rent is given by:  
where 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 are partially unobservable factors specific to properties in the Treated-Post cell. The 
same relationship applies to the other cells (Treated-Pre, Control-Post and Control-Pre). At the 
heart of our identification strategy we assume that the price trends unrelated to the policy are the 
same within the treatment and the control group. The typical identifying assumption on which the 
difference-in-differences identification strategy relies can be expressed as follows: 
The credibility of the counterfactual rests on the likelihood that the treatment group, in the ab-
sence of the intervention, would have followed a trend that is similar to that of the control group. 
An appropriate definition of the control group is therefore a critical element of the identification 
strategy. We therefore consider a number of different control groups in which we try to reduce 
the potential heterogeneity between properties in the treatment and control group.  
The first treatment group is a spatial match where we choose the observations that fall within a 
2km buffer surrounding CAs that changed designation status during the observation period 
(1995–2010). As an alternative, we consider a number of matching procedures that rest on the 
idea that properties inside CAs generally share similarities. Properties in CAs that did not change 
designation status therefore potentially qualify as a control group. To make the areas in the treat-
ment and control group more similar, we select CAs based on similarities with those in our treat-
ment group (Rosenbaum and Ruben, 1983). For the matching procedure we only make use of var-
𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) − (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛 − ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛) (A8) 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜃𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
(A9) 
(𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 − 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) =  (𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛 − 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛) (A10) 
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iables that turn out to have significant impact in the auxiliary propensity score matching regres-
sion.3 We use a nearest neighbour matching procedure, which produces a broader and a narrower 
group. 
Under the assumptions made it is straightforward to demonstrate that the DD treatment coeffi-
cient gives the pure policy effect we are interested in. Combining the theoretical bid rent of equa-
tion (A2) with the definition of ?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 in equation (A9) gives the conditional mean price of 
(treated) properties inside newly designated CAs before (pre) and after (post) designation:4 
where a new designation is represented as an increase in designation share 𝐷. For a control group 
sufficiently far away to not be exposed to the heritage externality we similarly get: 
where there is (by definition) no new designation. Given the common trend assumption of equa-
tion (A10), 𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 identifies the pure net policy effect of designation: 
In the empirical implementation of the DD strategy we also consider alternative treatment groups 
that consist of properties just outside CAs, which are potentially exposed to spillovers, but not to 
the cost of designation. The interpretation of the external treatment coefficient can be derived 
analogically where designation leads to benefits but without the associated costs: 
                                                             
3 A list of significant controls in propensity score matching regressions is included in the next subsection. 
4 Where the theoretical locations 𝑥 have been replaced by observed housing transactions 𝑖. 
?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝜑ℎ𝑖
1 − 𝛿
+
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
 
(A11) 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝜑ℎ𝑖
1 − 𝛿
+
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
(𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] +
𝑑𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝑑𝐷
) −
𝑐?̃?𝑖
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
(A12) 
?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛 (A13) 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛  (A14) 
𝛽𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
𝑑𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝑑𝐷
−
𝑐?̃?(𝑥)
1 − 𝛿
 (A15) 
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Under the common trends assumption the treatment coefficient reflects the pure policy benefit 
associated with the reduction in uncertainty as predicted by the stylised theory: 
Propensity score matching regression 
In order to determine the control group for the difference-in-differences specification, a propen-
sity score matching approach was employed. We used a stepwise elimination approach in order 
to determine which variables have a significant impact on the propensity score. With a signifi-
cance level criterion of 10% the following variables remained in the final CA propensity score 
estimation: 
CA characteristics: Urban, commercial, residential, industrial, world heritage site, at risk and Ar-
ticle 4 status. 
Environmental characteristics: Land Cover Type 9 (Inland bare ground), Land Cover Type 3 
(mountains, moors and heathland), distance to nearest national nature reserve, distance to near-
est national park, national park (kernel density) and area of outstanding natural beauty (kernel 
density).  
Neighbourhood characteristics: Median income and ethnicity Herfindahl index 
Amenities: Distance to nearest bar, distance to nearest Underground station, distance to nearest 
hospital, distance to nearest motorway and distance to nearest TTWA centroid. 
Semi-parametric temporal and spatial estimations of treatment effects 
We estimate a semi-parametric version of the time trend DD specification (14) that replaces the 
𝑌𝐷𝑖𝑡 variables with a full set of years-since-designation bins. We group transactions into bins de-
pending on the number of years that have passed since the CA they fall into or are near to had 
been designated. Negative values indicate years prior to designation. These bins (b) are captured 
by a set of dummy variables 𝑃𝑇𝑏: 
?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝛾𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝑢𝑃𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 (A16) 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝜏 +
1
1 − 𝛿
ln 𝑎𝑖 +
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
(𝐸[𝐻|𝐷] +
𝑑𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝑑𝐷
) + 𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 (A17) 
𝛽𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝛾
1 − 𝛿
𝑑𝐸[𝐻|𝐷]
𝑑𝐷
 (A18) 
Appendix to: Ahlfeldt/Moeller/Waights/Wendland: Game of zones 12 
The parameters 𝛽𝑏
𝐼  and 𝛽𝑏
𝐸 give the difference in prices between treatment and control groups in 
each years-since-designation bin 𝑏. The results of this semi-parametric estimation are plotted in 
Figure A3 in appendix 5.2. In order to allow for a casual inspection of the fit of the parametric 
models the semi-parametric point-estimates are also plotted in Figure 1 (internal) and Figure 2 
(external) of the main paper. 
As with the time trend DD, we relax the parametric constraints of the distance gradient DD by 
replacing the distance variable in equation (15) with distance bins: 
where 𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑑  are positive (external) and negative (internal) distance bins from the designation area 
boundary and 𝛽𝑑
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 are 𝑑 treatment effect parameters at different distances inside and outside 
the CA. If the planner designates according to local homeowner interests then the bin that corre-
sponds to the locations just inside the treated CA should indicate a zero treatment effect. This may 
or may not be associated with a positive effect for the bins that are deepest inside the CA. Further-
more, if there are significant externalities associated with the designation (and heritage in gen-
eral) then the bins just outside the boundary should indicate a positive effect. A lower effect for 
further out bins would indicate a spatial decay to this externality. The results from this specifica-
tion are presented Fig A4. in appendix 5.2 and in Figure 3 of the main paper. 
4 Data 
4.1 Data sources 
Housing transactions 
The transactions data relates to mortgages for properties granted by the Nationwide Building So-
ciety (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. The data for England comprise 1,088,446 observations and 
include the price paid for individual housing units along with detailed property characteristics. 
These characteristics include floor space (m²), the type of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, 
bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑏
𝐼 (𝑃𝑇𝑖
𝑏 × 𝐼𝑖)
𝑏
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑏
𝐸(𝑃𝑇𝑖
𝑏 × 𝐸𝑖)
𝑏
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑏𝑃𝑇𝑖
𝑏
𝑏
+ X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (A19) 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑑  (𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑑 × 𝑇𝑖)
𝑑
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑑
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑑 × 𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)
𝑑
+ X𝑖
′μ + 𝑓𝑛 + 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (A20) 
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or parking facilities and the type of heating. There is also some buyer information, including the 
type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold) and whether they are a first-time buyer. 
Importantly, the transaction data includes the full UK postcode of the property sold allowing it to 
be assigned to grid-reference coordinates. With this information it is possible within a Geograph-
ical Information Systems (GIS) environment to calculate distances to CA borders and to determine 
whether the property lies inside or outside these borders. Furthermore, it is possible to calculate 
distances and other spatial measures (e.g. densities) for the amenities and environmental charac-
teristics that will be used as control variables. Since the data set refers to postcodes rather than 
individual properties, it is not possible, however, to analyse repeated sales of the same property. 
This is a limitation shared with most property transaction data sets available in England, including 
the land registry data. 
Neighbourhood characteristics 
The main variables used for estimating the capitalisation effects of neighbourhood characteristics 
are median income and ethnic composition. The income data is a model-based estimate of median 
household income produced by Experian for Super Output Areas of the lower level (LSOA). This 
is assigned to the transaction data based on postcodes. The data on ethnicity was made available 
by the 2001 UK census at the level of Output Area (OA). Shares of each of the 16 ethnic groups and 
a Herfindahl index5 were computed to capture the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods. 
Environmental variables 
The environmental variables capture the amenity value of environmental designations, features 
of the natural environment, different types of land cover and different types of land use.  
Geographical data (in the form of ESRI shapefiles) for UK national parks, areas of outstanding nat-
ural beauty, and national nature reserves are available from Natural England. National parks and 
areas of outstanding natural beauty are protected areas of countryside designated because of their 
significant landscape value. National nature reserves are “established to protect sensitive features 
and to provide ‘outdoor laboratories’ for research” (National England website). Straight line dis-
tances to these designations were computed for the housing units as geographically located by 
                                                             
5 The Herfindahl index (𝐻𝐼) is calculated according to the following relation: 𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖  is the 
share of ethnicity 𝑖 in the LSOA, and N is the total number of ethnicities. 
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their postcodes. Furthermore, density measures that take into account both the distance to and 
the size of the features were created. We apply a kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986) with 
a radius of 2km which is considered to be the maximum distance people are willing to walk 
(Gibbons and Machin, 2005). 
The location of lakes, rivers and coastlines are available from the GB Ordinance Survey. The dis-
tance to these features is also computed for the housing units from the transaction data. The UK 
Land Cover Map, produced by the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology, describes land coverage by 
26 categories as identified by satellite images. We follow Mourato et al. (2010) who construct nine 
broad land cover types from the 26 categories. Shares of each of these nine categories in 1km grid 
squares are calculated and the housing units take on the value of the grid square in which they 
reside. 
The generalised Land Use Database (GLUD) available from the Department for Communities and 
Local Government gives area shares of nine different types of land use within Super Output Areas, 
lower level (LSOA). These nine land use types are domestic buildings, non-domestic buildings, 
roads, paths, rail, domestic gardens, green space, water and other land use. These shares are as-
signed to the housing units based on the LSOA in which they are located. 
Amenities 
The locational amenities variables capture the benefits a location offers in terms of accessibility, 
employment opportunities, quality of schools, and the proximity of cultural and entertainment 
establishments. 
Employment accessibility is captured both by the distance to the Travel to Work Area (TTWA) 
centroid and a measure of employment potentiality. TTWAs are defined such that 75% of employ-
ees who work in the area also live within that area. Thus, they represent independent employment 
zones and the distance to the centre of these zones is a proxy for accessibility to employment 
locations. A more complex measure of accessibility is the employment potentiality index (Ahlfeldt, 
2011).6 This is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA) and represents an average 
of employment in neighbouring LSOAs weighted by their distance. 
                                                             
6 Further detail on the construction of the employment potentiality measure is provided in section 4.2. 
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Key Stage 2 (ages 7–11) assessment scores are available from the Department for Education at 
the Super Output Area, middle layer (MSOA). School quality is thus captured at the housing unit 
level by computing a distance-weighted average of the KS2 scores of nearby MSOA centroids.7 
Geographical data on the locations of motorways, roads, airports, rail stations and rail tracks are 
available from the GB Ordinance Survey. Distances were computed from housing units to motor-
ways, A-roads, B-roads and rail stations to capture accessibility. Buffer zones were created around 
the motorways and roads along with distance calculations to rail tracks and airports in order to 
capture the disamenity noise effects of transport infrastructure. 
Further data on local amenities were taken from the Ordinance Survey (police stations, places of 
worship, hospitals, leisure/sports centres) and OpenStreetMap (cafés, restaurants/fast food out-
lets, museums, nightclubs, bars/pubs, theatres/cinemas, kindergartens and monuments, memo-
rials, monuments, castles, attractions, artwork). The number of listed buildings was provided by 
English Heritage. Kernel densities for these amenities were computed for housing units using a 
kernel radius of 2km and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 1986). The radius of 2km is con-
sistent with amenities having a significant effect on property prices only when they are within 
walking distance. 
                                                             
7 This is calculated as an Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) with a threshold distance of 5km and a  
power of 2. 
Tab. A2. Variable description 
Dependent Variable  
 
Price Per square metre transaction price in British pounds of the corresponding 
floor space (expressed as a natural logarithm). Transaction data from the 
Nationwide Building Society (NBS). 
Independent Variables  
 
CA Effects Dummy variables denoting property transactions taking place within the 
boundaries of a currently existing CA, in a CA at the time when designated 
or where the designation date is unknown as well as various buffer areas 
surrounding current or treated CAs. 
 
Fixed Effect Control Travel to Work Areas, nearest CA catchment areas and interactives with 
year effects. 
 
Housing information Set of property variables from the NBS including: Number of bedrooms, 
number of bathrooms, floor size (in square metres), new property (dummy), 
building age (years), tenure (leasehold/freehold), central heating (full: gas, 
electric, oil, solid fuel), central heating (partial: gas, electric, oil, solid fuel), 
garage (single or double), parking space, property type (detached, semi-de-
tached, terraced, bungalow, flat/maisonette). 
 
Neighbourhood infor-
mation 
Set of neighbourhood variables including: media income (2005, LSOA level), 
share of white population at total population (2001 census, output area 
level), share of mixed population at total population (2001 census, output 
area level), share of black population at total population (2001 census, out-
put area level), share of Asian population at total population (2001 census, 
output area level), share of Chinese population at total population (2001 
census, output area level), Herfindahl of ethnic segregation (including pop-
ulation shares of White British, White Irish, White other, Mixed Caribbean, 
Mixed Asian, Mixed Black, Mixed other, Asian Indian, Asian Pakistani, Asian 
others, Black Caribbean, Black African, Black other, Chinese, Chinese other 
population, 2001 census output area). 
 
Conservation area 
Characteristics 
Set of characteristic variables for CAs from English Heritage including: Con-
servation area land use (dummy variables for residential, commercial, in-
dustrial or mixed land use), CA type (dummy variable for urban, suburban 
or rural type), CA size (dummy for areas larger than a mean of 128,432.04 
square meters), CA (square meter), CA has an Article 4 Direction imple-
mented (dummy), oldness of CA (dummy for areas older than a mean of 
1981), CA at risk (dummy), CA with community support (dummy), CA is 
World Heritage Site (dummy). 
 
Environment Charac-
teristics and Amenities 
Set of locational variables processed in GIS including: National parks (dis-
tance to, density), areas of outstanding beauty (distance to, density), natural 
nature reserves (distance to, density), distance to nearest lake, distance to 
nearest river, distance to nearest coastline, land in 1km square: Marine and 
coastal margins; freshwater, wetland and flood plains; mountains, moors 
and heathland; semi-natural grassland; enclosed farmland; coniferous 
woodland; broad-leaved/mixed woodland; urban; inland bare ground. 
 
Other amenities Set of locational variables created in GIS including: Average key stage 2 test 
score (MSOA averages as well as interpolated in GIS), distance to electricity 
transmission lines, A-roads (distance to, buffer dummy variables within 
170m), B-roads (distance to, buffer dummy variable within 85m), motorway 
(distance to, buffer dummy variable within 315m; buffer distances refer to 
the distance were noise of maximum speed drops down to 50 decibel), dis-
tance to all railway stations, distance to London Underground stations, dis-
tance to railway tracks, distance to bus stations, distance to airports, densi-
ties of cafés, restaurants/fast food places, museums, nightclubs, bars/pubs, 
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4.2  Further notes on data methods 
Employment potentiality 
The employment potentiality index is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA) and 
represents an average of employment in neighbouring LSOAs weighted by their distances. Em-
ployment potentiality is calculated for each Lower Layer Super Output Area 𝑖 (LSOA) based on 
employment in all other LSOAs 𝑗 using the following equation: 
where 𝑑 measures the straight line distance converted into travel time assuming an overall aver-
age speed of 25km/h (Department for Transport, 2009) and E is the absolute number of workers 
in the respective LSOA. We use the spatial decay parameter of 𝑎 = −0.073 estimated by Ahlfeldt 
(2013). Internal distances are calculated as: 
Kernel densities for national parks, areas of outstanding natural beauty and national nature reserves 
The kernel density is a measure that takes into account both the proximity and the size of NPs, 
AONBs and NNRs. Every 100x100m piece of designated area is assigned a point and the density 
of these resulting points calculated for 10km kernels and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 
1986, p.76, equation 4.5) around each housing unit using a kernel density method. The result is 
similar to calculating a share of, for example, NP area within a circle, the one difference being that 
the points are additionally weighted by distance to the housing units according to a normal distri-
bution.  
theatres/cinemas, kindergartens, monuments (memorial, monument, cas-
tles, attraction, artwork), hospitals, sports/leisure centres, police stations 
and worship locations, distance to Travel to Work Areas, employment po-
tentiality (based on TTWAs with a time decay parameter of 0.073). 
 
Neighbourhood Dis-
tance Controls 
Set of neighbourhood distance dummy variables created in GIS including: 
Distances outside CA border (up to 50m, 100m, 150m, 200m, 250m, 300m, 
350m, 400m, 1km, 2km and 3km), distances inside CA border (up to 50m, 
100m, 150m, 200m). 
E𝑃𝑖 = ∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑒
−𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑗
 (A21) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗=𝑖 =
1
3
√
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖
𝜋
 
(A22) 
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Buffers for motorways and roads 
The buffer sizes for the different roads are as follows: B-road (85m), A-road (170m) and motor-
way (315m). These distances are calculated based on how far it is expected that the noise from 
traffic travelling at the speed limit of the respective roads (Steven, 2005) would decline to an as-
sumed disamenity threshold level of noise of 50db (Nelson, 2008). 
Land cover map broad categories 
Tab. A3. Land cover broad categories as defined by Mourato et al. (2010)  
1 Marine and coastal margins 
2 Freshwater, wetlands and flood plains 
3 Mountains, moors and heathland 
4 Semi-natural grasslands 
5 Enclosed farmland 
6 Coniferous woodland 
7 Broad-leaved/mixed woodland 
8 Urban 
9 Inland bare ground 
 
5 Estimation results 
5.1  Designation process 
In order to test our theoretical implication that changes in heritage preferences lead to changes in 
designation we estimate the regression model as outlined in section 3.1 in the main paper. The 
prediction of the model is that positive changes in heritage preferences should lead to negative 
changes in the share of non-designated land in a neighbourhood. OLS regression results are re-
ported in Table A4. We drop all zeros and identify the effect based on the sample of observations 
with observable changes in CA shares. The standard OLS estimates without (1) and with a basic 
set of composition controls (2) are insignificant. Due to the potential sources of bias in OLS dis-
cussed in the main paper (section 3.1) we re-estimate the two models using our instrumental var-
iables. The 2SLS estimates (3) and (4) are in line with the Tobit results reported in the main paper 
and support the theory that a positive change in degree share leads to higher designation. 
Tab. A4. Designation regressions: OLS/2SLS models  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) -0.016 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.602*** 
(0.096) 
-0.871*** 
(0.247) 
log degree share (t-1)  
 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
 
 
-0.379*** 
(0.105) 
log designation share (t-1)  
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.006* 
(0.004) 
Δ log homeownership (t)  
 
0.041 
(0.032) 
 
 
0.492*** 
(0.140) 
log homeownership (t-1)  
 
0.011 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.056 
(0.036) 
Δ log average household size 
(t) 
 
 
0.140 
(0.107) 
 
 
-0.483** 
(0.193) 
log average household size 
(t-1) 
 
 
0.209*** 
(0.032) 
 
 
-0.107 
(0.125) 
log pop age (t-1)  0.126*** 
(0.041) 
 -0.025 
(0.103) 
Δ pop age (t)  0.183*** 
(0.047) 
 -0.222 
(0.164) 
log foreigner share (t-1)  -0.019*** 
(0.007) 
 0.083*** 
(0.031) 
Δ foreigner share (t)  0.004 
(0.007) 
 0.068*** 
(0.026) 
Constant -0.040*** 
(0.011) 
-0.782*** 
(0.169) 
0.361*** 
(0.066) 
0.299 
(0.497) 
IV - - YES YES 
Controls - YES - YES 
R² 0.001 0.047 -0.733 -0.445 
F 1.516 15.628 38.934 5.724 
AIC -871.268 -925.893 -1.359 -268.685 
OVERID . . 2.936 2.103 
OVERIDP . . 0.087 0.147 
Observations 1580 1580 1580 1580 
Notes: Sample includes wards with changes in designation share. See the data section for a description of control 
variables. IVs are station density, employment potential and the degree share in 1981. Standard errors in 
parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
Table A5 reports the first-stage results to the second-stage results reported in Table 1 in the main 
paper. IVs are (conditionally) positively correlated with the change in degree share, and initial 
designation share, respectively. 
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Tab. A5. Standard IV models – First-stage regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree share 
(t) 
Δ log de-
gree 
share(t) x 
home-own-
ership (t-1) 
log degree 
share (t) 
rail station density 0.098*** 
(0.026) 
0.100*** 
(0.024) 
0.070*** 
(0.019) 
0.102*** 
(0.020) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.033 
(0.208) 
employment potentiality 2.14E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.08E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.85E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.97E-8*** 
(0.000) 
1.46E-9 
(0.000) 
7.54E-8  
(0.000) 
pred. Δ log degree sh. (t) 
x homeowners. (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.481*** 
(0.024) 
 
log degree share (t-1) 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.415*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
0.828*** 
(0.019) 
log designation share (t-
2) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
-0.021*** 
(0.008) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.025*** 
(0.008) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Δ log homeownership (t) 0.527*** 
(0.063) 
0.540*** 
(0.062) 
0.636*** 
(0.074) 
0.596*** 
(0.078) 
-0.007 
(0.030) 
-0.707*** 
(0.181) 
log homeownership (t-1) 0.145*** 
(0.030) 
0.174*** 
(0.033) 
0.228*** 
(0.045) 
0.183*** 
(0.041) 
0.213*** 
(0.019) 
-0.536*** 
(0.131) 
Δ log average hh. size (t) -0.445*** 
(0.076) 
-0.400*** 
(0.067) 
-0.495*** 
(0.079) 
-0.529*** 
(0.089) 
0.162* 
(0.068) 
-0.153 
(0.286) 
log average hh. size (t-1) -0.235*** 
(0.070) 
-0.277*** 
(0.069) 
-0.250** 
(0.086) 
-0.091 
(0.095) 
-0.006 
(0.045) 
-1.318** 
(0.442) 
log pop age (t-1) -0.087 
(0.052) 
-0.040 
(0.055) 
-0.289*** 
(0.072) 
0.001 
(0.059) 
0.008 
(0.033) 
0.584 
(0.335) 
Δ pop age (t) -0.321*** 
(0.086) 
-0.256*** 
(0.068) 
-0.490*** 
(0.095) 
-0.552*** 
(0.079) 
0.155*** 
(0.042) 
0.216 
(0.356) 
log foreigner share (t-1) 0.080*** 
(0.008) 
0.083*** 
(0.009) 
0.079*** 
(0.009) 
0.076*** 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.053 
(0.045) 
Δ foreigner share (t) 0.091*** 
(0.019) 
0.087*** 
(0.016) 
0.093*** 
(0.020) 
0.077*** 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.068) 
Log price trend   0.001 
(0.028) 
   
Δ log vacancy rate (t)  
 
 
 
0.037** 
(0.012) 
  
 
 
 
log vacancy rate (t-1)  
 
 
 
0.070*** 
(0.013) 
  
 
 
 
Log listed buildings  
 
 
 
0.008 
(0.004) 
  
 
 
 
log turnover in housing 
transactions (t) 
 
 
 
 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
   
log of share of building 
from pre1945 
 
 
 
 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
   
Constant 0.687** 
(0.233) 
0.537* 
(0.219) 
1.457*** 
(0.342) 
0.242 
(0.309) 
0.052 
(0.171) 
-0.739 
(1.446) 
TTWA FE - YES - - - - 
Housing cond. - - YES - - - 
Residential wards - - - YES - - 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7379 7965 7965 
F 592.006 . 339.162 508.799 . 1852.756 
R² 0.708 0.742 0.719 0.709 0.960 0.717 
Notes: Columns (1–4) are first stages of columns (2–5) in Table 1 in the main paper. Columns (5–6) are first stages 
of model (6) in the main paper. See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station 
density, employment potential and the degree share in t-2 all models. Model (3) includes a dummy variable 
indicating 60 wards for which no price trend could be computed due to insufficient transactions.  We derive 
the instrument (predicted Δ log degree share (t) x homeownership (t-1)) for the interaction term in model 
(5) by interacting homeownership (t-1) with the predicted values of an auxiliary regression where we re-
gress Δ log degree share on the exogenous variables, i.e. on the standard IVs and controls. Standard errors 
in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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We have tried four sets of instrumental variables with our benchmark model (Table 1, column 2 
in the main paper). The coefficient estimates reported in Table A6 remain qualitatively similar 
and quantitatively close to the main model. First-stage results are reported in Table A7. The alter-
native instruments, again, pass the validity tests. Only the overidentification test is failed by spec-
ification (1) using employment potentiality and museum density as instruments. 
Tab. A6. Alternative IV models  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log designa-
tion share (t) 
Δ log degree share (t) -0.828*** 
(0.113) 
-0.860*** 
(0.115) 
-0.845*** 
(0.111) 
-0.875*** 
(0.117) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.408*** 
(0.047) 
-0.421*** 
(0.047) 
-0.415*** 
(0.046) 
-0.427*** 
(0.048) 
log designation share (t-1) 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Δ log homeownership (t) 0.594*** 
(0.070) 
0.612*** 
(0.071) 
0.604*** 
(0.070) 
0.610*** 
(0.071) 
log homeownership (t-1) 0.194*** 
(0.023) 
0.196*** 
(0.023) 
0.194*** 
(0.023) 
0.197*** 
(0.023) 
Δ log average household 
size (t) 
-0.313*** 
(0.077) 
-0.329*** 
(0.078) 
-0.324*** 
(0.077) 
-0.334*** 
(0.078) 
log average household size 
(t-1) 
-0.281*** 
(0.075) 
-0.295*** 
(0.076) 
-0.289*** 
(0.075) 
-0.299*** 
(0.076) 
log pop age (t-1) -0.240*** 
(0.062) 
-0.246*** 
(0.062) 
-0.243*** 
(0.062) 
-0.246*** 
(0.062) 
Δ pop age (t) -0.270*** 
(0.083) 
-0.280*** 
(0.083) 
-0.277*** 
(0.082) 
-0.273*** 
(0.082) 
log foreigner share (t-1) 0.074*** 
(0.014) 
0.077*** 
(0.014) 
0.075*** 
(0.014) 
0.078*** 
(0.014) 
Δ foreigner share (t) 0.070*** 
(0.016) 
0.073*** 
(0.016) 
0.072*** 
(0.016) 
0.075*** 
(0.016) 
Constant 1.394*** 
(0.289) 
1.436*** 
(0.291) 
1.419*** 
(0.289) 
1.438*** 
(0.291) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
IV YES YES YES YES 
Observations  7965 7965 7965 7968 
CHI2 319.851 318.289 321.092 316.186 
EXOG_P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OVERID 2.289 0.084 0.500 0.233 
OVERIDP 0.130 0.772 0.479 0.629 
Instruments (as densities ex-
cept employment pot.) 
Employment 
potentiality 
Employment 
potentiality 
Employment 
potentiality 
Rail station  
Museum  Coffee place  Bar  Coffee place  
Notes: Baseline model is in column (2) in Table 1 in the main paper. First-stage results are in Table A7. See the data 
section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. 
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
Furthermore, we split the long difference between 1991 and 2011 into two shorter differences of 
1991 to 2001 and 2001 to 2011. For the latter short difference, we moreover use the change in 
income instead of change in degree as a proxy for heritage preferences. The coefficient estimates 
remain qualitatively similar to the main model and are reported with their first stages in tables 
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A8 and A9. The coefficient of the key variable is slightly smaller than in the benchmark specifica-
tion of the short difference between 1991 and 2001 (column 4) and considerably larger for the 
period between 2001 and 2011 (column 8). In columns (9–12) we use income as a proxy of herit-
age preference. Focussing on the benchmark specification in the final column, doubling income 
more than quadruples the designation share. The respective instruments are valid and sufficiently 
strong. Overall, the results are in line with our theory; increases in heritage preferences, proxied 
by changes in degree share or change in income, lead to increases in designation shares. 
Tab. A7. Alternative IV models – First-stage regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
employment potentiality 3.07E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.95E-8*** 
(0.000) 
2.85E-8*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
museum density 0.086 
(0.053) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
coffee place density  
 
0.004 
(0.004) 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
bar density  
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.003) 
 
 
rail station density  
 
 
 
 
 
0.196*** 
(0.018) 
log degree share (t-1) -0.409*** 
(0.010) 
-0.410*** 
(0.010) 
-0.411*** 
(0.010) 
-0.409*** 
(0.009) 
log designation share (t-2) 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Δ log homeownership (t) 0.521*** 
(0.064) 
0.516*** 
(0.063) 
0.521*** 
(0.067) 
0.534*** 
(0.061) 
log homeownership (t-1) 0.137*** 
(0.032) 
0.135*** 
(0.034) 
0.141*** 
(0.034) 
0.128** 
(0.039) 
Δ log average household 
size (t) 
-0.465*** 
(0.070) 
-0.463*** 
(0.070) 
-0.455*** 
(0.070) 
-0.441*** 
(0.077) 
log average household size 
(t-1) 
-0.272*** 
(0.067) 
-0.276*** 
(0.066) 
-0.257*** 
(0.061) 
-0.240*** 
(0.064) 
log pop age (t-1) -0.099 
(0.051) 
-0.099 
(0.052) 
-0.088 
(0.053) 
-0.101 
(0.052) 
Δ pop age (t) -0.314*** 
(0.086) 
-0.316*** 
(0.090) 
-0.312*** 
(0.085) 
-0.345*** 
(0.086) 
log foreigner share (t-1) 0.081*** 
(0.009) 
0.082*** 
(0.009) 
0.081*** 
(0.009) 
0.087*** 
(0.010) 
Δ foreigner share (t) 0.090*** 
(0.019) 
0.091*** 
(0.019) 
0.091*** 
(0.019) 
0.091*** 
(0.018) 
Constant 0.039 
(0.092) 
0.051 
(0.094) 
0.035 
(0.091) 
-0.015 
(0.091) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7968 
F 568.539 566.433 573.506 525.781 
R² 0.706 0.706 0.707 0.705 
Notes: Second-stage results are in Table A6. See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard 
errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
Tab. A8. Short differences and income model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 
 Δ log designation share (t) 
Δ log degree share 
(t) 
-0.017** 
(0.009) 
-0.216*** 
(0.021) 
-0.066*** 
(0.014) 
-0.483*** 
(0.079) 
0.477*** 
(0.052) 
1.653*** 
(0.126) 
-0.010 
(0.080) 
-2.129** 
(0.919) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log degree share 
(t-1) 
 
 
 
 
-0.056*** 
(0.007) 
-0.185*** 
(0.024) 
 
 
 
 
-0.117*** 
(0.027) 
-0.535*** 
(0.182) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log designation 
share (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
Δ log homeowner-
ship (t) 
 
 
 
 
-0.056*** 
(0.007) 
0.386*** 
(0.056) 
 
 
 
 
-0.117*** 
(0.027) 
0.732* 
(0.385) 
 
 
 
 
-0.027 
(0.116) 
1.194*** 
(0.434) 
log homeowner-
ship (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
0.129*** 
(0.028) 
0.077*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
-0.122 
(0.115) 
0.340*** 
(0.127) 
 
 
 
 
0.098** 
(0.042) 
0.777*** 
(0.237) 
Δ log average 
household size (t) 
 
 
 
 
0.068*** 
(0.013) 
-0.245*** 
(0.062) 
 
 
 
 
0.057 
(0.037) 
-0.727 
(0.450) 
 
 
 
 
0.190 
(0.181) 
0.074 
(0.272) 
log average house-
hold size (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.037) 
-0.162*** 
(0.049) 
 
 
 
 
0.219 
(0.185) 
-0.099 
(0.177) 
 
 
 
 
0.278*** 
(0.095) 
0.129 
(0.149) 
log pop age (t-1)   -0.027 
(0.037) 
-0.158*** 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
 
0.241** 
(0.095) 
0.041 
(0.185) 
  0.285** 
(0.112) 
-1.364** 
(0.559) 
Δ pop age (t)   -0.109*** 
(0.033) 
-0.188*** 
(0.056) 
 
 
 
 
0.389*** 
(0.112) 
-0.107 
(0.362) 
  0.519** 
(0.217) 
-2.009** 
(0.899) 
log foreigner share 
(t-1) 
  -0.044 
(0.048) 
0.057*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
 
 
0.557*** 
(0.211) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
  -0.025* 
(0.015) 
0.101** 
(0.046) 
Δ foreigner share 
(t) 
  0.001 
(0.004) 
0.121*** 
(0.025) 
 
 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.038) 
  -0.026 
(0.028) 
-0.104** 
(0.048) 
Δ log income  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.218*** 
(0.069) 
-9.330*** 
(2.024) 
-0.142** 
(0.070) 
-7.305*** 
(2.364) 
log income (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.144*** 
(0.037) 
-0.909*** 
(0.261) 
Constant 0.159*** 
(0.005) 
0.224*** 
(0.009) 
0.489*** 
(0.143) 
0.864*** 
(0.167) 
0.317*** 
(0.022) 
-0.126*** 
(0.043) 
-1.436*** 
(0.472) 
0.367 
(0.900) 
0.549*** 
(0.027) 
2.881*** 
(0.524) 
0.007 
(0.556) 
13.647*** 
(4.552) 
IV - YES - YES - YES - YES - YES - YES 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7965 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 
CHI2  103.847  202.519  170.741  203.917  21.242  88.061 
EXOG_P  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.012  0.000  0.000 
OVERID  7.555  1.413  1.385  19.198  13.526  0.741 
OVERIDP  0.006  0.235  0.239  0.000  0.000  0.389 
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. First-stage results are in Table A9. Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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Tab. A9. Short differences and income model – First-stage regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 
 Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
log designa-
tion share  
(t-1) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
Δ log degree 
share (t) 
log designa-
tion share  
(t-1) 
Δ log income 
(t) 
Δ log income 
(t) 
log designa-
tion share 
(t-1) 
rail station density 0.055 
(0.049) 
0.053* 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.208) 
-0.062*** 
(0.010) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.059 
(0.151) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
0.018 
(0.029) 
0.066 
(0.159) 
employment potenti-
ality 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
log degree share (t-1)  
 
0.055 
(0.049) 
0.053* 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.208) 
-0.062*** 
(0.010) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
 
 
 
log designation share 
(t-2) 
 
 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.828*** 
(0.019) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.922*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.927*** 
(0.009) 
Δ log homeownership 
(t) 
 
 
0.586*** 
(0.067) 
-0.613** 
(0.232) 
 
 
0.408*** 
(0.048) 
-1.137*** 
(0.328) 
 
 
0.172 
(0.101) 
-1.232*** 
(0.343) 
log homeownership (t-
1) 
 
 
0.061** 
(0.022) 
-0.431*** 
(0.118) 
 
 
0.143*** 
(0.018) 
-0.114 
(0.102) 
 
 
0.110*** 
(0.028) 
-0.141 
(0.126) 
Δ log average house-
hold size (t) 
 
 
-0.534*** 
(0.044) 
-0.161 
(0.325) 
 
 
-0.424*** 
(0.093) 
0.664 
(0.725) 
 
 
-0.009 
(0.089) 
0.733 
(0.733) 
log average household 
size (t-1) 
 
 
-0.253*** 
(0.041) 
-1.519*** 
(0.436) 
 
 
-0.139* 
(0.059) 
0.273 
(0.258) 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.067) 
0.227 
(0.249) 
log pop age (t-1)  0.004 
(0.048) 
0.555 
(0.337) 
 
 
-0.154*** 
(0.045) 
0.744* 
(0.350) 
 
 
-0.217*** 
(0.058) 
0.896* 
(0.345) 
Δ pop age (t)  -0.231*** 
(0.051) 
0.311 
(0.370) 
 
 
-0.325*** 
(0.077) 
0.152 
(0.455) 
 
 
-0.362** 
(0.118) 
0.245 
(0.443) 
log foreigner share (t-
1) 
 0.110*** 
(0.009) 
0.085* 
(0.042) 
 
 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.064 
(0.045) 
 
 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
-0.035 
(0.046) 
Δ foreigner share (t)  0.267*** 
(0.017) 
0.061 
(0.084) 
 
 
0.026* 
(0.012) 
0.023 
(0.065) 
 
 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.021 
(0.066) 
Log income (t-1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.114*** 
(0.020) 
0.191 
(0.101) 
Constant 0.297*** 
(0.008) 
0.278 
(0.209) 
-0.336 
(1.438) 
0.389*** 
(0.005) 
0.790*** 
(0.221) 
-3.160* 
(1.479) 
0.255*** 
(0.004) 
1.880*** 
(0.239) 
-5.076** 
(1.602) 
Controls - YES YES - YES YES - YES YES 
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 7966 
F 134.968 557.956 1891.124 73.689 464.362 3091.590 8.301 17.028 2640.502 
R² 0.124 0.590 0.717 0.095 0.614 0.856 0.004 0.103 0.856 
Notes: Second-stage results in Table A8 (instrumented models) See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed 
effects. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. 
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5.2  Equilibrium designation 
Baseline DD results: Extended results 
Table A10 below reports the CA effects as well as a set of estimated hedonic implicit prices 
(housing characteristics in particular) for the difference-in-differences estimation given by 
equation (13) in the main paper. In keeping with intuition, housing units with more bathrooms 
and bedrooms fetch higher prices, as do detached, semi-detached and bungalows (over the 
omitted category flats/maisonettes). The sales price of terraced housing is significantly larger 
than sales prices of otherwise comparable flats/maisonettes in some, but not all, models. 
Larger floor spaces are associated with higher prices but with diminishing effects. There is a 
premium for new properties. Leased properties are of less value than those owned. Properties 
with parking spaces, single garages and double garages sell for higher prices than those with-
out any parking facilities. There is a house price premium for properties with central heating 
over other types of heating. In order to control for a potentially non-linear relationship be-
tween housing age and house prices we included a series of house age bins. In order to separate 
the effects of pure building age (which may be associated with deterioration) from the build 
date (which may strongly determine the architectural style) we allow for age cohort and build-
ing data cohort effects. Since the ‘New property’ variable identifies all properties where the 
build age is zero years, the omitted category from the age variables is 1–9 years. All of the bins 
for properties older than this indicate significant negative premiums. The negative premium 
increases with age, mostly quickly over the first few categories and then more slowly until the 
penultimate category and finally decreases for buildings over 100 years. The effect of the build 
date is also non-linear. The general tendency is for buildings built in earlier periods to have 
higher prices than buildings built in the omitted period 2000–2010. However, this effect be-
comes insignificant in the 60s and 70s; periods associated with the architectural styles of the 
post-war reconstruction phase that are today less appreciated than other styles. The greatest 
premium is attached to houses built pre-1900, the earliest category. 
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Tab. A10. Conservation area premium – designation effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log property transaction price 
Inside treated CA × Post 
designation 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.024 
(0.070) 
-0.077 
(0.111) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA × Post des. 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Inside treated CA -0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
-0.062 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.108) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
Within 500m buffer of 
treated CA 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
Number of bathrooms 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.057*** 
(0.008) 
0.059*** 
(0.006) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Number of bedrooms 0.166*** 
(0.002) 
0.172*** 
(0.004) 
0.169*** 
(0.005) 
0.165*** 
(0.005) 
0.170*** 
(0.014) 
0.179*** 
(0.011) 
0.158*** 
(0.006) 
Number of bedrooms 
squared 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Detached house 0.254*** 
(0.003) 
0.222*** 
(0.005) 
0.211*** 
(0.008) 
0.194*** 
(0.007) 
0.235*** 
(0.015) 
0.216*** 
(0.014) 
0.193*** 
(0.007) 
Semi-detached house 0.119*** 
(0.003) 
0.097*** 
(0.004) 
0.088*** 
(0.007) 
0.070*** 
(0.006) 
0.082*** 
(0.014) 
0.066*** 
(0.012) 
0.073*** 
(0.006) 
Terraced house/country 
cottage 
0.040*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
Bungalow 0.311*** 
(0.003) 
0.285*** 
(0.006) 
0.281*** 
(0.008) 
0.257*** 
(0.009) 
0.292*** 
(0.019) 
0.269*** 
(0.016) 
0.257*** 
(0.009) 
Floorsize (m²) 0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
Floorsize squared -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
New property 0.084*** 
(0.002) 
0.087*** 
(0.004) 
0.088*** 
(0.005) 
0.088*** 
(0.006) 
0.047** 
(0.024) 
0.076*** 
(0.017) 
0.077*** 
(0.006) 
Leasehold -0.054*** 
(0.003) 
-0.067*** 
(0.004) 
-0.065*** 
(0.006) 
-0.073*** 
(0.006) 
-0.100*** 
(0.014) 
-0.104*** 
(0.012) 
-0.070*** 
(0.006) 
Single garage 0.112*** 
(0.001) 
0.097*** 
(0.002) 
0.100*** 
(0.003) 
0.097*** 
(0.003) 
0.096*** 
(0.007) 
0.097*** 
(0.005) 
0.098*** 
(0.003) 
Double garage 0.190*** 
(0.002) 
0.162*** 
(0.003) 
0.161*** 
(0.005) 
0.159*** 
(0.005) 
0.160*** 
(0.015) 
0.156*** 
(0.010) 
0.158*** 
(0.005) 
Parking space 0.076*** 
(0.001) 
0.063*** 
(0.002) 
0.065*** 
(0.003) 
0.061*** 
(0.003) 
0.052*** 
(0.007) 
0.049*** 
(0.005) 
0.063*** 
(0.003) 
Central heating 0.089*** 
(0.001) 
0.094*** 
(0.002) 
0.098*** 
(0.003) 
0.100*** 
(0.003) 
0.085*** 
(0.007) 
0.094*** 
(0.007) 
0.095*** 
(0.003) 
Building age: 10–19 years -0.047*** 
(0.002) 
-0.063*** 
(0.003) 
-0.062*** 
(0.004) 
-0.075*** 
(0.005) 
-0.071*** 
(0.016) 
-0.068*** 
(0.015) 
-0.069*** 
(0.005) 
Building age: 20–29 years -0.079*** 
(0.002) 
-0.106*** 
(0.005) 
-0.104*** 
(0.007) 
-0.125*** 
(0.008) 
-0.133*** 
(0.026) 
-0.126*** 
(0.021) 
-0.113*** 
(0.007) 
Building age: 30–39 years -0.092*** 
(0.003) 
-0.127*** 
(0.006) 
-0.123*** 
(0.010) 
-0.150*** 
(0.011) 
-0.169*** 
(0.032) 
-0.141*** 
(0.027) 
-0.133*** 
(0.009) 
Building age: 40–49 years -0.104*** 
(0.004) 
-0.148*** 
(0.008) 
-0.142*** 
(0.012) 
-0.180*** 
(0.013) 
-0.199*** 
(0.036) 
-0.165*** 
(0.031) 
-0.158*** 
(0.011) 
Building age: 50–59 years -0.121*** 
(0.004) 
-0.171*** 
(0.009) 
-0.167*** 
(0.015) 
-0.207*** 
(0.016) 
-0.232*** 
(0.044) 
-0.204*** 
(0.038) 
-0.175*** 
(0.014) 
Building age: 60–69 years -0.135*** 
(0.005) 
-0.198*** 
(0.011) 
-0.194*** 
(0.019) 
-0.238*** 
(0.020) 
-0.320*** 
(0.051) 
-0.265*** 
(0.042) 
-0.215*** 
(0.018) 
Building age: 70–79 years -0.136*** 
(0.006) 
-0.213*** 
(0.013) 
-0.207*** 
(0.021) 
-0.263*** 
(0.022) 
-0.326*** 
(0.053) 
-0.273*** 
(0.046) 
-0.234*** 
(0.019) 
Building age: 80–89 years -0.132*** 
(0.007) 
-0.218*** 
(0.014) 
-0.213*** 
(0.023) 
-0.277*** 
(0.024) 
-0.339*** 
(0.062) 
-0.313*** 
(0.054) 
-0.243*** 
(0.021) 
Building age: 90–99 years -0.111*** 
(0.008) 
-0.208*** 
(0.016) 
-0.204*** 
(0.025) 
-0.280*** 
(0.027) 
-0.360*** 
(0.068) 
-0.304*** 
(0.063) 
-0.248*** 
(0.023) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log property transaction price 
Building age: Over 100 
years 
-0.083*** 
(0.009) 
-0.176*** 
(0.017) 
-0.176*** 
(0.027) 
-0.261*** 
(0.030) 
-0.348*** 
(0.074) 
-0.284*** 
(0.065) 
-0.227*** 
(0.025) 
Build date: 1900–1909 0.040*** 
(0.009) 
0.121*** 
(0.018) 
0.128*** 
(0.028) 
0.208*** 
(0.031) 
0.256*** 
(0.077) 
0.222*** 
(0.067) 
0.173*** 
(0.025) 
Build date: 1910–1919 0.074*** 
(0.008) 
0.153*** 
(0.016) 
0.158*** 
(0.027) 
0.226*** 
(0.028) 
0.262*** 
(0.071) 
0.256*** 
(0.059) 
0.196*** 
(0.024) 
Build date: 1920–1929 0.093*** 
(0.007) 
0.157*** 
(0.014) 
0.162*** 
(0.024) 
0.215*** 
(0.025) 
0.225*** 
(0.062) 
0.189*** 
(0.050) 
0.190*** 
(0.021) 
Build date: 1930–1939 0.082*** 
(0.006) 
0.128*** 
(0.013) 
0.130*** 
(0.021) 
0.168*** 
(0.023) 
0.187*** 
(0.058) 
0.163*** 
(0.045) 
0.151*** 
(0.020) 
Build date: 1940–1949 0.040*** 
(0.005) 
0.078*** 
(0.012) 
0.078*** 
(0.018) 
0.111*** 
(0.021) 
0.063 
(0.058) 
0.053 
(0.048) 
0.096*** 
(0.018) 
Build date: 1950–1959 0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
0.041*** 
(0.016) 
0.057*** 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.047) 
-0.004 
(0.039) 
0.046*** 
(0.015) 
Build date: 1960–1969 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.044) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
Build date: 1970–1979 -0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.059 
(0.042) 
-0.046 
(0.033) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
Build date: 1980–1989 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
-0.023 
(0.038) 
-0.010 
(0.029) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
Build date: 1990–1999 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.034) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
Build date: pre 1900 0.098*** 
(0.009) 
0.149*** 
(0.018) 
0.162*** 
(0.029) 
0.244*** 
(0.031) 
0.312*** 
(0.081) 
0.259*** 
(0.070) 
0.216*** 
(0.026) 
Location cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighbourhood cont. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES - - - - - 
Nearest treated CA effects - - YES YES YES YES - 
Matched CA effects - - - - - - YES 
Treatment group: CAs 
designated 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2010 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2002 
1996-
2010 
Control group Full Eng-
land sam-
ple 
Within 
2km of 
treated CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-1996 
CA & 
within 
2km of 
treated CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA desig-
nated 
1987-
1995 & 
within 
4km of 
treated CA 
Within 
500m of 
CA desig-
nated 
2003-
2010 & 
within 
4km of 
treated CA 
Within 
500m of 
pre-
1996 CA 
matched 
on pro-
pensity 
score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.915 0.861 0.864 0.909 
AIC -587375 -156426 -130469 -67044 -5410 -8475 -41206 
Observation 1088k 302k 302k 178k 214k 323k 133k 
Notes:  Extended presentation of Table 2 in the main paper. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 
location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4)–(7) have separate fixed effects 
for the areas inside and outside a CA. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Time trend DD and distance gradient DD: Parametric estimates 
Tables A11 and A12 present the parametric estimates of specifications (14) and (15), which 
are discussed but not reported in section 5.2 of the main paper to save space. 
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Tab. A11.  Time trend DD effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 log property transaction price 
Inside treated CA × Post designation 0.015 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.027 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.038* 
(0.023) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
0.020 
(0.024) 
Within 500m buffer of treated CA  
× Post designation 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
Inside treated CA × Years designated 0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.020* 
(0.011) 
Inside treated CA × Years designated²  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Inside treated CA × Post designation  
× Years designated 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.026** 
(0.012) 
0.032** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
Inside treated CA × Post Designation  
× Years designated² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Years designated 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Years designated² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Post designation ×Years des. 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
Within 500m of treated CA  
× Post designation × Years des.² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighbourhood controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES - - - YES YES - - - 
Nearest treated CA effects - - YES YES - - - YES YES - 
Matched CA effects - - - - YES - - - - YES 
Control group as in Table 2, column (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) 
R² 0.920 0.921 0.912 0.914 0.907 0.920 0.921 0.912 0.914 0.907 
AIC -547,688 -147,818 -120,160 -64,425 -39,321 -548,078 -147,839 -120,191 -64,467 -39,329 
Observations 995k 277k 277k 164k 123k 995k 277k 277k 164k 123k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4)–(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas 
inside and outside a CA. Observations dropped if years designated falls outside of range -10 years:+10 years. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Tab. A12.  Distance gradient DD effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 log property transaction price 
Within 1400m of treated CA × 
Post designation 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
Within 1400m of treated CA × 
Distance to boundary x Post des. 
-0.057 
(0.081) 
-0.032 
(0.075) 
-0.030 
(0.080) 
-0.029 
(0.077) 
-0.070 
(0.068) 
-0.096 
(0.156) 
-0.046 
(0.154) 
-0.040 
(0.162) 
-0.040 
(0.157) 
-0.118 
(0.143) 
Within 1400m of treated CA × 
Distance to boundary² × Post des. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.059 
(0.132) 
-0.017 
(0.131) 
-0.018 
(0.140) 
-0.017 
(0.136) 
-0.099 
(0.130) 
Outside treated CA × Post desig-
nation 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
Outside treated CA × Distance to 
boundary × Post des. 
0.039 
(0.081) 
0.016 
(0.075) 
0.013 
(0.080) 
0.011 
(0.078) 
0.046 
(0.069) 
0.064 
(0.157) 
0.014 
(0.155) 
0.013 
(0.163) 
0.004 
(0.159) 
0.080 
(0.145) 
Outside treated CA × Distance to 
boundary² × Post des. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.070 
(0.133) 
0.028 
(0.132) 
0.025 
(0.140) 
0.029 
(0.136) 
0.109 
(0.130) 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Neighbourhood controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ward effects YES YES - - - YES YES - - - 
Nearest treated CA effects - - YES YES - - - YES YES - 
Matched CA effects - - - - YES - - - - YES 
Control group Full Eng-
land sam-
ple 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1.4km of 
CA desig-
nated be-
fore 1996 
& within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1.4km of 
pre-1996 
CA 
matched 
on pro-
pensity 
score 
Full Eng-
land sam-
ple 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1.4km of 
CA desig-
nated be-
fore 1996 
& within 
2km of 
treated 
CA 
Within 
1.4km of 
pre-1996 
CA 
matched 
on pro-
pensity 
score 
R² 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.914 0.905 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.914 0.921 
AIC -587,538 -156,448 -130,478 -118,076 -101,076 -587,533 -156,444 -130,478 -118,074 -587,538 
Observation 1088k 302k 302k 281k 327k 1088k 302k 302k 281k 327k 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0 
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Semi-parametric temporal and spatial treatment effects 
Figure A3 reports the results for the semi-parametric estimation of the temporal effects of des-
ignation using equation (A19). We compare the bin estimates for the naïve DD in the left panels 
to the matched CA control group in the right panels. The left charts show that the post-period 
internal and external estimates deviate significantly from the pre-period mean (hence the sig-
nificant DD estimates) but that this is driven by a general upward trend. This corroborates the 
results in Table A11, column (1), where no significant discontinuity nor shift in trend for the 
naïve control group exists and hence the advantages of the time trend DD over the standard 
DD method is highlighted. The charts in the right panels also corroborate the evidence pre-
sented using the parametric trends equations in the main paper (Figure 1). Specifically, they 
show that for the internal effects the post-treatment estimates tend not to deviate significantly 
from the pre-treatment effects but that there are upward shifts in the trend when compared to 
the pre-treatment trend. For the external effects there is a general upward trend in the less 
carefully matched control groups and a downward trend in the stronger control groups but no 
shift in the trend at the designation date. 
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Fig A3.  Semi-parametric temporal bins estimates 
Internal effects: Full dataset 
Control group as in Table A10 column (1) 
 
Internal effects: Matched CA 
Control group as in Table A10 column (7) 
 
External effects: Full dataset 
Control group as in Table A10 column (1) 
 
External effects: Matched CA 
Control group as in Table A10 column (7) 
 
Notes:  The solid black line plots the estimated differences between treatment group and control group against 
year since designation date using equation (A19). The dashed lines indicate the 5% confidence intervals. 
The left charts show results for the control group used in column (1) of appendix Table A10. The right 
charts show results for the control group used in column (7) of appendix Table A10. The horizontal red 
line illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates. 
Figure A4 demonstrates the semi-parametric distance gradient DD effects using different bin 
sizes of 100m and 200m using appendix equation (A20). These semi-parametric charts closely 
resemble their parametric counterparts. Notably, there is no significant and positive effect in 
the first bin outside the CA when using the preferred specification of column (7) from Table 
A10. This is consistent with the parametric findings and baseline DD findings that there is no 
significant external policy effect and that our second hypothesis cannot be accepted. There is, 
however, one significant bin inside the CA at 200–300m. This provides some support for the 
idea that heritage externalities are stronger deeper within the CAs such that there may be a 
positive policy effect. This effect then declines to zero for the deepest bin of greater than 300m. 
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In general, the large functional flexibility of the bin models comes at the cost of large standard 
errors since they are demanding in terms of degrees of freedom. While these estimates are 
informative with respect to the spatial pattern of heritage externalities, it is difficult to statisti-
cally affirm the existence of policy effects.   
Fig A4.  Semi-parametric spatial bins estimates 
200m bins: Full dataset 
Control group as in Table A12., column (1) 
 
200m bins: Matched CA 
Control group as in Table A12., column (5) 
 
100m bins: Full dataset 
Control group as in Table A12., column (1) 
 
100m bins: Matched CA 
Control group as in Table A12., column (5) 
 
Notes:  The solid black line plots the difference-in-differences treatment effect at different distances from the 
CA boundary using appendix equation (A20). The dashed lines indicate the 5% confidence intervals. The 
left charts show results for the control group used Table A12., column (1). The right charts show results 
for the control group used in Table A12., column (5). The horizontal red lines illustrate the mean of the 
pre-treatment estimates, the final pre-period bin and the first post-period bin. 
  
Ahlfeldt/Möller/Waights/Wendland: Game of zones 33 
6 Literature 
Ahlfeldt, G. M. (2011). If Alonso was right: Modeling Accessibility and Explaining the 
Residential Land Gradient. Journal of Regional Science, 51(2), 318-338.  
Ahlfeldt, G. M. (2013). If we build it, will they pay? Predicting property price effects of transport 
innovations. Environment and Planning A, 45(8), 1977 – 1994.  
Department for Transport. (2009). Transport Statistics Bulletin, Road Statistics 2008: Traffic, 
Speeds and Congestion.  London. 
Gibbons, S., and Machin, S. (2005). Valuing rail access using transport innovations. Journal of 
Urban Economics, 57(1), 148-169.  
Mourato, S., Atkinson, G., Collins, M., Gibbons, S., MacKerron, G., and Resende, G. (2010). 
Economic Analysis of Cultural Services. In U. N. E. A. Report (Ed.). 
Nelson, J. (2008). Hedonic Property Value Studies of Transportation Noise: Aircraft and Road 
Traffic. In A. Baranzini, J. Ramirez, C. Schaerer and P. Thalmann (Eds.), Hedonic Methods 
in Housing Markets (pp. 57-82): Springer New York. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., and Ruben, D. B. (1983). The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects. Biometrica, 70(1), 41-55.  
Silverman, B. W. (1986). Density Estimation For Statistics and Data Analysis. Monographs on 
Statistics and Applied Probability.  
Steven, H. (2005). Investigations on Noise Emission of Motor Vehicles in Road Traffic: Research 
Project 200 54 135 ; Final Report: RWTUEV Fahrzeug, Inst. for Vehicle Technology, 
Division noise, measurement technique, modelling. 
 
 
